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The latest in a long line of reform proposals, health courts have been called “the
best option for fixing our broken system of medical justice.” And, if health courts’
supporters are to be believed, these specialized courts are poised to revolutionize
medical malpractice litigation: They would offer faster compensation to far more
people, while restoring faith in the reliability of legal decisionmaking. But these
benefits are, as some leading supporters have acknowledged, “hoped for, but
untested.” The question remains: Will health courts actually operate as effectively as
proponents now predict?
The best evidence to answer that question comes, I suggest, from the Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program (VICP)—a Program that employs very similar
procedures to handle very similar claims and that had, at its birth, a very similar
ambition. Mining nearly three decades of previously untapped material concerning
the VICP’s operation, this Article analyzes how an American compensation
program that wrests jurisdiction from traditional courts has, in practice, fared.
Findings are discouraging. Though the VICP and health courts share many of the
same procedural innovations, those innovations, in the VICP context, have largely
failed to expedite adjudications and rationalize compensation decisions. This fact
carries significant implications for health courts, suggesting that they won’t operate
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nearly as effectively as their proponents now predict. More broadly, this study of an
American no-fault regime, in action and over time, enriches—and at times
complicates—current understanding of the prospects, promise, and “perceived
virtues” of other specialized courts and alternative compensation mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Health courts are the reform du jour.1 Health court legislation—which
would wrest medical malpractice cases from common law courts in favor of
adjudication in specialized, dedicated tribunals—has been introduced in
more than half a dozen states,2 while bills to charter pilot projects have been
introduced in both houses of Congress.3 President Obama has expressed
cautious support.4 Health courts are, apparently, popular with the American
1 In the words of the President of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
“[h]ealthcare courts are an idea whose time has come.” COMMON GOOD, AN URGENT CALL FOR
SPECIAL HEALTH COURTS 7 (2005).
2 States include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
See S.B. 1134, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (creating health courts); H.B. 897, 2013 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2013) (same); S.B. 141, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013) (same); H.B. 3166, 97th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011) (same); Assemb. B. 8066-A, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2007) (authorizing health court pilot projects); S.B. 655, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007)
(establishing medical malpractice court); S.B. 678, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (proposing
demonstration program); S.J. Res. 90, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006) (authorizing continuation
of subcommittee studying the feasibility of a pilot health court, and ultimately a system of health
courts); H.R.J. Res. 183, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006) (same); see also Freeman L. Farrow, The
Anti-Patient Psychology of Health Courts: Prescriptions from a Lawyer-Physician, 36 AM. J.L. & MED.
188, 193 n.26 (2010) (citing additional state legislation).
3 Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005); Medical Liability Procedural Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1546, 109th Cong. (2005); see also THE PATIENT CHOICE,
AFFORDABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND EMPOWERMENT ACT 8 (2015), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/114/20150205
-PCARE-Act-Plan.pdf (stating that states have the option to establish health courts presided over
by a judge with expertise in health care).
4 President Obama’s 2012 Federal Budget allocated funding for state medical justice reforms,
including health courts. See Press Release, Common Good, President Obama’s Budget Includes a
Breakthrough to Address Medical Malpractice Reform and Move Beyond Partisanship (Feb. 16,
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public.5 And, the health court concept has been endorsed by the Institute of
Medicine (IOM),6 the U.S. deficit commission,7 leading editorial boards,8
powerful non-profits (including the American Medical Association (AMA)9),
distinguished think tanks (including the nonpartisan Brookings Institute,10
the left-leaning Progressive Policy Institute,11 and the right-leaning Heritage

2011), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/president-obamas-budget-includes-abreakthrough-to-address-medical-malpractice-reform-and-move-beyond-partisanship116313134.html. Further, the Affordable Care Act encourages states to “to develop and test
alternatives to the civil litigation system” and authorizes $50 million in grants to develop such
alternatives. See Health Reform and Medical Malpractice Reform, NAT’L CENTER FOR POL’Y
ANALYSIS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=20587, archived at
http://perma.cc/K6EV-SBFK.
5 Press Release, Common Good, Nationwide Clarus Poll Reveals that a Large Majority of
U.S. Voters Think Legal System Increases Cost of Health Care (May 29, 2012), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nationwide-clarus-poll-reveals-that-a-large-majorityof-us-voters-think-legal-system-increases-cost-of-health-care-155365335.html (reporting that a 2012
survey funded by Common Good found that 66% of voters support the health court concept). But
cf. Maxwell J. Mehlman & Dale A. Nance, The Case Against “Health Courts” 95-96 (Apr. 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1785383 (identifying problems with the design of similar surveys).
6 See COMM. ON RAPID ADVANCE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: HEALTH CARE FIN. &
DELIVERY SYS., INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING
FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 10, 83 (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002).
7 See Press Release, Common Good, Federal Deficit Commission Endorses Health Courts
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/federal-deficit-commissionendorses-health-courts-111387224.html.
8 See, e.g., Docs in the Dock: Why Not Set Up Special Courts for Malpractice Suits?, FIN. TIMES,
July 13, 2004, at 12; Editorial, ‘Health Courts’ Offer Cure, USA TODAY, July 5, 2005, at 12A;
Editorial, Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2005, at 50-51; see also Editorial, Guilty in
Health Court: Cut Medical Bills by Clipping Wings of Ambulance Chasers, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010,
at B2 (“The sensibility of health courts is so accepted that lawmakers seem to take their eventual
adoption for granted.”).
9 See AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES 1 (2007) (“AMA policy indicates that
health courts are a promising reform proposal that merits further investigation.”); AM. MED.
ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW!: THE FACTS YOU NEED TO KNOW TO ADDRESS
THE BROKEN MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 31 (2014) (stating that “the AMA supports the testing
and evaluation of health court pilot projects as an innovative way to address the medical liability
problem”).
10 See ENGELBERG CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, BROOKINGS INST., BENDING THE
CURVE: PERSON-CENTERED HEALTH CARE REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CARE
AND
SLOWING HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH 32 (2013), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/04/person%20centered%20health%2
0care%20reform/person_centered_health_care_reform.pdf (suggesting the federal government
should help fund “innovative reform models” for medical liability).
11 See NANCY UDELL & DAVID B. KENDALL, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., HEALTH
COURTS: FAIR AND RELIABLE JUSTICE FOR INJURED PATIENTS (2005).
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Foundation12), respected academics,13 and politicians from both sides of the
proverbial aisle.14
Central to health courts’ appeal is the contention that these tribunals—
featuring specialized adjudicators, neutral experts, circumscribed damages,
and a relaxed liability standard (“avoidability” rather than negligence)—will
expedite medical malpractice adjudications, quell the adversarialism of
dispute resolution, and provide consistent, rational rulings that would
“restore faith in the reliability of medical justice.”15 Yet in more sober
moments, health court advocates also acknowledge that these administrative
benefits are not certain to materialize.16
Though it’s rarely discussed, much rides on whether health courts will or
won’t achieve these lofty objectives. For one, health courts’ ability to
actually expedite, simplify, and rationalize compensation decisions is crucial
to a fairness analysis, for if health courts are apt to resolve plaintiffs’ claims
in a speedy, streamlined, and reliable manner, all parties will derive a clear
benefit from health courts’ creation. On the other hand, if these “benefits”
are illusory, health courts might start to look like a one-sided, rather than
even-handed, reform. So, too, whether health courts will expedite and
streamline adjudications is central to the cost question, for nearly all agree
that far more injured patients will file claims in a health court system, as
compared to the relative few who file claims currently. This means that if

12 See RANDOLPH W. PATE & DEREK HUNTER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., CODE BLUE:
THE CASE FOR SERIOUS STATE MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM 12-14 (2006) (discussing the
benefits of establishing special health courts).
13 See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 231-32 (2008) (listing health
courts’ distinguished academic supporters); Paul Barringer, Let’s Create Health Courts, NAT’L L.J.,
May 2, 2005, at 22 (reporting that health courts have been endorsed by ten university presidents
and eleven medical school deans).
14 For example, health courts have been endorsed by both the Senate Republican Policy
Committee and the Democratic Leadership Council. See U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY
COMM., MEANINGFUL HEALTH CARE REFORM BEGINS WITH HEALTH COURTS (2006);
Health Courts for Fair and Reliable Justice, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COUNCIL ( June 30, 2008),
http://web.archive.org/web/20060207071234/http://www.dlc.org/print.cfm?contentid=253435.
Common Good, a nonprofit that has relentlessly championed health courts, boasts an Advisory
Board that spans the political spectrum, from Bill Bradley on the left to Newt Gingrich on the
right. See Leadership, COMMON GOOD, http://commongood.org/pages/leadership (last visited
Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ATD8-PD79.
15 Philip K. Howard, Just Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at A27; see also, e.g., UDELL &
KENDALL, supra note 11, at 15 (“Health courts would make the malpractice system swift and
reliable for all.”); infra note 92 and accompanying text.
16 Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 76 (2008) [hereinafter
Mello et al., Policy Experimentation] (cataloging health courts’ anticipated advantages, while
recognizing that they are “hoped for, but untested”).
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the cost per adjudication does not plummet, the aggregate price of claim
resolution could soar.17
Finally, but less obviously, health courts’ capacity to expedite,
streamline, and rationalize compensation decisions is critical to resolving
simmering constitutional questions. Constitutional questions loom large
because if health courts are enacted, opponents are sure to challenge these
tribunals. Opponents will allege that, in curtailing victims’ compensation
and denying them the right to a trial by jury, health courts violate victims’
rights to due process and equal protection and run afoul of many states’
open court, separation of powers, and right-to-jury-trial guarantees.18
Evaluating these constitutional claims, many reviewing courts will
presumably ask the same question they’ve asked and answered on other
occasions: In abrogating victims’ common law remedy, did the legislature
accompany the abrogation with a sufficient tangible benefit? Was there, in
other words, an adequate quid pro quo?19 So far, those defending health
courts’ constitutionality have suggested that a tangible benefit justifying the
withdrawal is “the system’s promise to deliver faster, more reliable
compensation decisions.”20 Whether that “promise” is or is not realistic thus
takes on weighty constitutional significance.
So the answer to the question—Will health courts actually expedite,
streamline, and rationalize compensation decisions?—is profoundly
17 Currently, some suggest that “creating reliable health courts . . . would save tens of billions
of dollars a year.” Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., Why We Need Health Courts for Medical Cases,
NEWSDAY (Feb. 17, 2013, 10:35 PM), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/howard-why-weneed-health-courts-for-medical-cases-1.4665357, archived at http://perma.cc/69MZ-YMHM.
18 See Amy Widman, Why Health Courts Are Unconstitutional, 27 PACE L. REV. 55, 81 (2006)
(asserting that health courts unconstitutionally “strip the right to redress in the courts without
offering anything up in return”); Francine A. Hochberg, The Injustice of Health Courts, TRIAL, May
2008, at 42, 52 (“The most significant problem with the proposed health courts, and the true
impediment to their widespread adoption . . . is constitutional.”); see also Mehlman & Nance, supra
note 5, at 107-11 (raising constitutional objections). If Congress were to enact health courts,
additional constitutional issues would emerge. For a discussion of these issues, see generally E.
David Elliott et al., Administrative “Health Courts” for Medical Injury Claims: The Federal Constitutional Issues, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 761 (2008); Amy Widman & Francine A. Hochberg,
Federal Administrative Health Courts Are Unconstitutional: A Reply to Elliott, Narayan, and Nasmith,
33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799 (2008).
19 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (upholding New York’s
workers’ compensation law against constitutional challenge because, though the “employee is no
longer able to recover as much as before . . . he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of
injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy”); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d
541, 555 (Kan. 1990) (“Due process requires that the legislature substitute the viable statutory
remedy of quid pro quo (this for that) to replace the loss of the right.”). The U.S. Supreme Court
has not yet clearly incorporated a quid pro test into its due process analysis, though it has toyed
with the idea. See Widman, supra note 18, at 76.
20 Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 101-02.
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important. Yet while many have taken sides on the broader health court
controversy, this question has received remarkably little attention. Beyond
referencing the positive experiences of a few somewhat analogous systems
overseas,21 and the decidedly mixed experiences of neurological birth injury
funds in Florida and Virginia,22 health court champions have said little
21 Health court proponents have studied the no-fault experiences of New Zealand, Sweden,
and Denmark because, they say, those nations’ experiences “shed[] light” on how health courts
would operate in the United States. MICHELLE M. MELLO ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND, PUB. NO. 1517, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL INJURIES: LESSONS
FROM THREE FOREIGN SYSTEMS 2 (2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Jul/1517_Mello_admin_compensation_med_injuries.pdf;
see also Allen B. Kachalia et al., Beyond Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation, 66
SOC. SCI. & MED. 387 (2008). Yet while there is value to this international study, I suggest that
the experiences of these foreign systems are, for at least three reasons, of limited relevance. I say
this, first, because, as compared to the countries proponents study, the United States has a unique
“way of law”—including a far better-financed, more sophisticated, and more politically powerful
plaintiffs’ bar and a more deeply embedded preference for the adversarial resolution of claims. See
generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
Shedding this adversarial culture is unlikely to be easy. Second, the countries’ medical malpractice
environments are notably dissimilar. At the time New Zealand enacted its transformative
Accident Compensation Act, for example, New Zealand had almost no medical malpractice
litigation to speak of, with fewer than 100 arguably serious claims filed each year. See Marc A.
Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27
STAN. L. REV. 653, 670 (1975). Or, at the time Sweden adopted its patient compensation system,
medical malpractice compensation flowed to approximately ten patients annually. See Patricia M.
Danzon, The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Myths and Realities, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
453, 454 (1994). Not so in the United States today. Third, the underlying provision of social
services is strikingly different—meaning the job of accident compensation in New Zealand,
Sweden, and Denmark is far less demanding than the same job within the United States. See
Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault
Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199, 228 n.193 (1992); see also FRANK A.
SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 302-03 (2008) (identifying additional
differences between the tort systems of Sweden and New Zealand on the one hand and the United
States on the other).
Of course, though, the question remains: Do these (and myriad other) differences matter
when it comes to the on-the-ground performance of no-fault mechanisms? My intuition is they
do. Indeed, the rocky vaccine injury experience recounted herein suggests that the United States is
distinctive. Automobile no-fault legislation does as well—as our auto no-fault experiment was
broadly seen as a bust as the system became bloated and bogged down (leading to its repeal in
many states), while in New Zealand, for example, auto no-fault has been widely heralded as a
success. Compare Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012) [hereinafter Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation] (tracing the rise
and fall of the American experiment with automobile no-fault legislation), with TERENCE G.
ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME 187
(1980) (discussing the success of automobile no-fault in New Zealand).
22 See, e.g., Gil Siegal et al., Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims in Florida and Virginia: The
Experience of a Landmark Experiment in Personal Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 493
(2008); David M. Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In: Florida’s Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 499 (2000) [hereinafter
Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In]. The programs instituted in Florida and Virginia are much
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about why and how health courts will achieve these all-important objectives.
And health courts’ many detractors, while raising strenuous objections to
health courts’ constitutionality,23 cost,24 fairness,25 independence,26
stinginess,27 and susceptibility to political capture, have mostly surrendered
on this score.28 Meanwhile, no one has carefully assessed this question using
the best evidence currently available. What is that best evidence? I suggest
it comes from the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP or
Program), which has been quietly compensating those suffering from
vaccine injury in the United States since October 1, 1988.
Adjudication within health courts mimics adjudication within the VICP
along many relevant dimensions. In terms of substantive reach, both resolve
medical claims, where technical evidence is common and causation
questions loom large.29 In terms of ambition, both health courts and the
VICP seek to be generous, rather than tightfisted, with the articulated aim
of providing adequate, though circumscribed, payments to a higher
proportion of injured individuals. In terms of applicable law, both modify—
and liberalize—the traditional tort standard of recovery. Health courts
would apply an “avoidability” standard that straddles strict liability and
negligence, while the VICP discards fault entirely. In terms of personnel,
both dispense with lay juries and generalist judges in favor of adjudication
smaller than the VICP. For example, as of 2007, Virginia’s program had received only 192 claims.
See Siegal et al., supra, at 502. For criticism of the programs’ performance, see infra notes 318-19,
389 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24 See Maxwell J. Mehlman & Rebecca G. Maine, Health Courts Will Not Cure All Liability
Ills, BULLETIN, Mar. 2013, at 32, 35 (assailing health courts as an “expensive bureaucracy that
infringes on the rights of injured, vulnerable patients”).
25 See Farrow, supra note 2, at 197 (opposing health courts because these courts “will inevitably be pro-medical industry and anti-patient in their operation”).
26 See Emily Chow, Note, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with
Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 387, 410 (2007) (opposing
health courts because, given the charged nature of malpractice decisions, “political pressures . . . would inevitably pervade the health court bench”).
27 See Joanne Doroshow, The Health Courts Facade, TRIAL, Jan. 2006, at 20, 27 (opposing
health courts because, inter alia, they would “result in severe undercompensation for most
patients”).
28 For limited exceptions, see, for example, Peters, supra note 13, at 260-68 (expressing skepticism that health courts could increase efficiency without sacrificing decisional accuracy and
substantive fairness); Widman, supra note 18, at 79 (noting that “claims of efficiency and speed of
process are belied by almost every other alternative compensation system, each of which is
plagued with a host of bureaucratic . . . problems”); Doroshow, supra note 27, at 22 (stating, in
passing, that “[c]laims that health courts would be more efficient at meting out justice are
unfounded”).
29 There is, in fact, literal overlap between claims adjudicated within the two systems as the
Vaccine Act preempts certain claims against physicians. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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by specialist triers of fact. In terms of procedure, both admit evidence
pursuant to flexible and informal standards, encourage reliance on
independent experts, and compel the publication of decisions. In terms of
time to adjudication, both systems underscore the importance of speed.
Health court advocates suggest that these tribunals would offer justice
within a year, while the VICP imposes a hard statutory deadline requiring
that compensation decisions “shall” be issued “not later than 240
days . . . after the date the petition was filed.”30 In terms of decision aids,
both health courts and the VICP feature a special and highly touted
innovation: accelerated compensation events (ACEs) and the Vaccine Injury
Table, respectively. Created by experts and periodically updated in light of
scientific evidence, both ACEs and the Table identify injuries that are
caused by inadequate healthcare or vaccines, respectively, and then fasttrack qualifying claims for easy resolution. Finally, at the tail end of
litigation, both health courts and the VICP restrict damages, limit payments
to petitioners’ counsel, and permit appeals, though only pursuant to a
highly deferential standard of review.
Given the systems’ obvious similarities, and given that we have nearly
three decades of experience with the VICP—a tribunal that has, so far,
adjudicated over 14,000 petitions31—it seems essential that lessons from the
VICP be brought to bear as we weigh whether to embark on the health
court experiment.32
Furthermore, a study of the VICP does not just matter in its own right.
The study contributes to two broader, and enduring, debates. The push to
enact health courts can first be seen as part of a larger effort, dating back
over a century, to shuttle categories of cases out of courts of general
jurisdiction and into specialized, dedicated tribunals. Like health courts,
these specialized courts (now numbering in the dozens) are often

30 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012). For more on this requirement, see infra note 154
and accompanying text.
31 See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: MONTHLY STATISTICS REPORT
(2015), available at http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statisticsreport.pdf.
32 Others, in passing, have said as much. See, e.g., MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA,
EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM: A REPORT TO THE
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (MEDPAC) 29 (2010) (suggesting that policymakers can make some predictions about health courts’ likely administration based on study of, inter
alia, the VICP); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Medical Liability and Patient Safety: Are Health
Courts and Medicare the Keys to Effective Change?, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 252, 276-77
(2006) (observing that the VICP and health courts are similar in many respects and that the VICP
“model deserves much more attention than it has received”). This is the first Article to offer the
analysis.
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championed for offering litigants increased efficiency, quality, and
uniformity.33 But, though the contention that judicial specialization
expedites case resolution, elevates the quality of judicial decisionmaking,
and breeds consistency is surely logical and intuitively appealing, it has, too
often in the past, been accepted on faith. Much has been said—by health
court proponents, as well as others—about what specialization ought to do.
Relatively little has been said about what specialization does do.34 Moving
beyond the familiar incantation of specialized courts’ “perceived virtues,”
this Article starts a grounded inquiry into what judicial specialization has
actually, in context and over time, managed to achieve.35
Moreover, the VICP is not just a specialized court. It is also what some
call a “replacement regime”—it is a regime that jettisons tort law, with its
individualized consideration of fault and idiosyncratic calculation of
damages, in favor of a government-administered no-fault alternative.36
Replacement regimes are the go-to weapon in serious tort reformers’
33 See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 32-33 (2011) (dubbing these the “neutral virtues” of judicial specialization); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts:
Specialists Versus Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 793 (2013) (“The conventionally claimed
benefits of specialized courts go to their potential efficiency, subject matter expertise, and, if they
are given a monopoly over the subject matter, uniformity of decisions.”). While specialization is
often celebrated for the reasons above, others identify potential pitfalls, including that specialized
judges might, on average, display a tendency toward insularity or tunnel vision and be more
susceptible to politicization, political capture, or outside influence. For more on these, and other,
possible drawbacks, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 16 (1990);
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 95 (2013); Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the
Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 550-56 (2008); David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman,
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
68-75, 84-85 (1975); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377,
377-82; Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 85765 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 88-109 (1995).
34 See BAUM, supra note 33, at 34, 218 (decrying the paucity of proof and stating, for example,
that “efficiency is the virtue most closely associated with specialization . . . but there is little
evidence on this issue”); id. at 210 (“To the extent that participants in the policy-making process
think explicitly about how specialization might affect court outputs, they tend to act on the basis
of folk theories that rest on common-sense notions of causality rather than on extensive and
systematic analysis.”); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration
Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1541 (2010) (observing that “effects that seem nearly certain to follow
from specialization do not necessarily occur in practice”); Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 33, at
794 (recognizing that “there is still no empirical foundation for the proposition that specialized
judges are more efficient than generalists in the production of judgments”).
35 See Oldfather, supra note 33, at 849-50, 865 (observing that there “exists a relatively large
body of literature” outlining specialized courts’ “perceived virtues” but asserting that much of the
literature is contradictory or inadequately supported).
36 For more on “replacement” regimes, see THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND
LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 38-41 (2002).
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collective arsenals. Over the past century, such schemes have been
advocated dozens of times, proposed for everything from motor vehicle
accidents,37 to nuclear accidents,38 to airline accidents,39 to railway
accidents,40 to those who contract HIV after transfusion with tainted
blood,41 to those hurt in schoolyard play,42 to those injured in athletic
competition,43 to those harmed following contact with (variously)
prescription drugs,44 medical devices,45 contraceptives,46 asbestos,47 lead
paint,48 cigarettes,49 and firearms.50 Yet even as reformers frequently call for
tort’s replacement, and even though many reformers explicitly model their
proposed regimes on existing no-fault mechanisms (including, frequently, the
VICP itself ),51 surprisingly few have paused to consider how these no-fault

37 See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
38 See, e.g., Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
39 See, e.g., Gail Appleson, Airlines Seek Reform of Compensation System, 68 A.B.A. J. 1071 (1982).
40 See, e.g., Arthur A. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 705 (1916).
41 See, e.g., Keith M. Garza, Administrative No-Fault Recovery for Transfusion-Related HIV
Infection, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 384 (1993).
42 See, e.g., JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE
FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).
43 See, e.g., Paul Grant, No-Fault Insurance for Sports Injuries, FREE LANCE-STAR, Sept. 27,
1983, at 15.
44 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 21, at 237.
45 See, e.g., JAMES R. COPLAND & PAUL HOWARD, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, PROJECT FDA REPORT NO. 1, IN THE WAKE OF WYETH V. LEVIN: MAKING THE CASE
FOR FDA PREEMPTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPENSATION (2009); Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the Potential for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 793 (2011).
46 See, e.g., Janet Benshoof, Protecting Consumers, Prodding Companies, and Preventing Conception: Toward a Model Act for No Fault Liability for Contraceptives, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 403, 405 (1997).
47 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
48 See, e.g., DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES: GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 228 (2010).
49 See, e.g., id. at 222-23.
50 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley & John G. Culhane, Op-Ed., Make Gun Companies Pay Blood
Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, at A21.
51 See, e.g., Garza, supra note 41, at 390-91 (proposing a compensation system for victims of
transfusion-related HIV infection, explicitly modeled on the VICP); Jackson, supra note 21, at 23536 (advocating a no-fault system for pharmaceuticals modeled on the VICP); Finley & Culhane,
supra note 50 (calling for a government-administered fund to compensate victims of gun violence,
explicitly modeled on the VICP); see also COPLAND & HOWARD, supra note 45 (promoting a
compensation system for those injured by drugs and medical devices “modeled on” the VICP);
Malika Kanodia, The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of Riegel v. Medtronic: Should Congress
Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 834 (2009) (same, while suggesting that such a system would
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systems, long in operation in the United States, have thus far fared.52
Drawing on previously untapped material, this Article offers a sustained
empirical account of the VICP to begin the process of bridging that gap.53
The remainder unfolds as follows. Part I identifies the problems that
plague the medical malpractice system, catalogs the various (misdirected)
medical malpractice reforms initiated over the past four decades, and closes
with a description of health courts—a new and seemingly promising reform
designed to revolutionize the adjudication of medical injury claims within
the United States. Part II shifts gears to focus on vaccines. It provides
background on the problem of vaccine injury, which crested in the mid1980s; discusses Congress’s subsequent enactment of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986; and introduces the VICP, a
specialized court which has, over the past three decades, adjudicated
thousands of petitions for what is, essentially, medical injury. Part III then
considers health courts and the VICP side-by-side. Detailing the systems’
many similarities, Part III suggests that the VICP offers a near-ideal context
to test whether health courts’ many procedural innovations are apt to fulfill
proponents’ hopes of dramatically expediting adjudications (delivering
permit payments to be “made in a more even-handed, predictable, and timely fashion than the
current tort system allows”).
52 For example, in a recent New York Times op-ed, Professors Finley and Culhane propose a
compensation fund for innocent victims of gun violence, modeled on the VICP. In so doing, they
assert that the VICP “avoids the time, expense and inefficiencies of litigation.” Finley & Culhane,
supra note 50. As we shall see, a close study of the VICP casts doubt on that assertion. See also, e.g.,
Garza, supra note 41, at 390 (stating that the VICP “has proved effective in administering
compensation of injured vaccinees” and asserting “[b]ecause vaccinees and persons injured through
blood transfusions are similarly situated, one can expect similar positive results”). Researchers
have conducted a limited number of studies of American no-fault regimes in action. See, e.g.,
JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 7 (2010); JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT
& REVIEW COMM’N OF THE VIRGINIA GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF THE VIRGINIA BIRTHRELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2003) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
AUDIT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT-P-30-84-20, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT
VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES (1985);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-8, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION:
PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY AND EASILY 2 (1999) [hereinafter 1999
GAO REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-142, VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION: MOST CLAIMS TOOK MULTIPLE YEARS AND MANY WERE SETTLED
THROUGH NEGOTIATION 2 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 GAO REPORT]; Randall R. Bovbjerg &
Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 55 (1998);
Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 497; Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In, supra note 22, at 499.
53 Via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, I have obtained thousands of pages of
transcripts from quarterly meetings of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines
(ACCV). The ACCV is a nine-member commission charged by Congress with “advis[ing] the
Secretary [of HHS] on the implementation of the Program,” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-19(f ) (2012), and
transcripts of their meetings offer a behind-the-scenes view of the VICP in action.
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compensation decisions within one year of filing), quelling adversarialism,
and eliminating decisional discrepancies.
With that prefatory work completed, Part IV reveals that, despite its
many procedural innovations, the VICP has struggled to resolve claims
consistently or quickly. Despite predictions at enactment that the VICP
would “guarantee” equal treatment to similarly situated claimants, a lack of
consistency continues to bedevil the Program.54 Notwithstanding Congress’s
demand that special masters “shall,” with limited exceptions, issue decisions
within 240 days,55 adjudications within the VICP often take years and, in
fact, take longer than litigation, to judgment, within the traditional tort
system.56 And, notwithstanding the many procedural shortcuts the VICP
employs to simplify damage calculations, the calculation of damages tends
to tack on another year—or sometimes two—to the resolution of petitions.57
Part IV further identifies concrete reasons why the VICP’s challenges ought
to give health court proponents pause, suggesting that the problems that
have plagued the VICP seem just as likely to plague health courts going
forward. To be sure, this analysis does not prove that health courts won’t
outperform the tort system.58 Nor does it prove, more broadly, that health
courts aren’t worthwhile. But it does call into question certain crucial—and
heretofore conventionally accepted—claims about health courts’ ostensible
administrative advantages.
Finally, Part V steps back to consider why the VICP has stumbled. This
examination identifies four issues that have plagued the VICP since its
inception, contributing to many of the concrete problems identified above.
These include: the difficulty of establishing “actual causation” in certain
(identifiable) contexts; the double-edged nature of decision-aids; the burden
of boundary definition, especially in non-self-contained substantive areas;
and creeping party adversarialism. Further, a careful analysis reveals that
these four issues have not only bedeviled the VICP. Drawing on research
concerning workers’ compensation, neurological birth injury funds in
Florida and Virginia, and state automobile no-fault plans, I show, instead,

54 See Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A
Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 162-63 (1988) (predicting that the
VICP would “guarantee” equal treatment). For further discussion on decisional disparities, see
infra Section IV.A.
55 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012).
56 See infra Section IV.B and particularly infra note 253 and accompanying text.
57 For damage calculation difficulties, see infra Section IV.C.
58 Indeed, though this Article raises numerous concerns about the VICP, only rarely can I
show that the VICP underperforms vis-à-vis the tort system when it comes to adjudicating similar
claims.
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that these problems have similarly and quite consistently plagued other
American no-fault mechanisms. Identifying these persistent challenges—
and, also, in certain instances, the conditions that tend to make them
worse—the Article closes with insights that ought to inform not only our
expectations for health courts, but also, and more generally, our design and
deployment of future specialized courts and tort replacement mechanisms.
I. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH COURT CONCEPT
A. Origins: Medical Malpractice’s Heavy Toll
Viewed from any perspective, medical mistakes are a serious problem.
Medical errors affect a significant proportion of patients. Indeed, the best
evidence suggests that roughly 1% of hospitalized patients are victims of
bona fide medical malpractice,59 while another 1% to 1.5% of hospitalized
patients are “preventably,” though not necessarily negligently, hurt by the
care they receive.60 Because U.S. hospitals admit roughly 35 million patients
each year, preventable errors affect as many as 700,000 Americans
annually.61 Further, some of these injuries are serious. Each year, 44,000 to
98,000 Americans die because of medical mistakes,62 which means that
59

See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUB20 (1985) (reporting results of the 1974 California study, which estimated that the risk
of negligent injury was 1 per 126 hospital admissions); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF
MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION
43 (1993) (“Our results indicate that in New York in 1984 . . . about 1 percent of all patients
hospitalized suffered a negligent medical injury.”); David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and
Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 253 (2000) [hereinafter
Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice] (suggesting that the negligent injury rate in Utah
and Colorado hospitals in 1992 was approximately 0.9% and 0.8%, respectively).
60 See Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of
the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377, 378-79 (1991) (finding that, of
30,195 hospitalized patients, 1133 suffered adverse events and 58% of all adverse events stemmed
from management errors—suggesting that roughly 2.2% of patients suffered preventable adverse
events); Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255, 259
(1999) (estimating that, of studied hospitalized patients in Utah and Colorado, approximately 1.9%
suffered preventable adverse events).
61 See Hospital Admissions per 1,000 Population by Ownership Type, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/admissions-by-ownership (last visited Apr. 24, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/TQ8F-B2VS. (reporting annual admission data by state).
62 See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda
T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Even this may understate medical injury’s toll, as the figures do not
include deaths due to medical negligence that occur in nonhospital settings (including doctors’
offices, nursing homes, and outpatient clinics). Additionally, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
derived its estimate from studies (including those cited above) that identified errors via medical
records, though it is quite well established that medical records do not memorialize all medical
mistakes. See generally Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice
LIC POLICY
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medical errors may cause more deaths per year than all other accident types
combined.63
The medical malpractice system—which is to say the civil liability
system’s response to the above injuries—also takes a significant toll. The
system’s direct economic cost is substantial. Indeed, research suggests that
administrative costs alone (in legal fees and insurer overhead) total more
than $6 billion.64 Its indirect costs are also considerable, as physicians report
that fear of liability impacts the tests they perform, the medication they
prescribe, and the referrals they make.65 This contributes to “defensive
medicine” (care provided solely, or primarily, to reduce the probability of
litigation), which, studies suggests, adds billions of dollars to the nation’s
annual healthcare bill.66 And, by all accounts, the physicians who are sued
are deeply, and negatively, affected. Charges of malpractice are associated
with depression, anger, and frustration, and doctors who have been sued are
significantly more likely to consider an early retirement, advise their
children not to practice medicine, and stop seeing the patients they perceive
as more likely to sue going forward.67
Further, the system has, in recent decades, imposed greater and greater
costs. Though lawsuits have dropped in recent years,68 viewed from a longer
time horizon, the picture reflects sharply increased activity. Malpractice
insurance premiums have spiraled upward over the past few decades, from
just under $500 million in 1960 (in inflation-adjusted dollars) to roughly $10

Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357 (2005) (finding, on the basis of a hospital observational
study, a sizable gap between reported and actual errors).
63 See WEILER ET AL., supra note 59, at 55 (“Medical injury . . . accounts for more deaths
than all other types of accidents combined . . . .”).
64 See Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1569, 1570 (2010) [hereinafter Mello et al., National Costs].
65 See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians
in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2609, 2612 (2005) (reporting that
93% of surveyed physicians in high-risk specialties admitted altering their clinical behavior because
of the risk of malpractice liability).
66 There is little consensus concerning just how widespread defensive medicine is or how
large of a toll it takes, though most agree its cost is substantial. See, e.g., Mello et al., National
Costs, supra note 64, at 1572-74 (estimating that defensive medicine accounted for $45.6 billion in
healthcare costs in 2008).
67 See Peters, supra note 13, at 256-57 (synthesizing relevant evidence).
68 See CYNTHIA G. LEE & ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1, 3 (2011), available at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/highlights/18_1_medical_malpractice_i
n_state_courts.ashx (showing a steep drop in medical malpractice case filings in courts of general
jurisdiction from 1999 to 2008).
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billion today,69 while physicians’ likelihood of facing a claim has also
ballooned. Prior to 1960, only one in seven physicians was named in a
malpractice claim in an entire career, while in recent years, one in fourteen
faces a malpractice claim annually.70 Further, the medical malpractice system
touches, in some direct way, nearly every doctor. By retirement age, “75% of
physicians in low-risk specialties and 99% of those in high-risk specialties
[a]re projected to face a [malpractice] claim.”71 And, because claims take so
long to resolve, the average physician spends more than four years—or
roughly 11% of her career—practicing medicine under the shadow of an
open and unresolved malpractice allegation.72
Finally, and many think worst of all, the situation has never been
particularly satisfactory from the injured patients’ perspective. A tiny
fraction of those hurt by medical error (on the order of 2% to 3%) ever even
attempt to claim compensation.73 Of those who do initiate claims, many fall
short: Doctors prevail in roughly three-quarters of medical malpractice jury
trials,74 and, overall, approximately 40% of patients who retain counsel never
69 In 1960, medical malpractice insurance premiums totaled $60 million. See Robert H. Brook
et al., The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1197.
Adjusted for inflation, this would be approximately $476 million. See CPI Inflation Calculator,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BC9C-U9EY. In 2012, premiums totaled $10 billion. See NAT’L
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION: KEY FACTS AND MARKET TRENDS
(2013). It is worth noting, however, that premiums have not soared on an inflation-adjusted, perphysician basis, particularly when compared to other practice expenses. See Marc A. Rodwin et al.,
Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income: Perceptions of a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence,
25 HEALTH AFF. 750, 751-52 (2006).
70 Compare KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 105 (2008) (“Before 1960, only one out of every
seven physicians experienced a malpractice claim in an entire career.”), with Anupam B. Jena et
al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629, 632 (2011)
(reporting that, in any given year, from 1991 through 2005, 7.4% of all studied physicians
experienced a malpractice claim).
71 Jena et al., supra note 70, at 633. By age 65, 71% of physicians in high-risk specialties can be
expected to make an indemnity payment. See id. at 634.
72 See Seth A. Seabury et al., On Average, Physicians Spend Nearly 11 Percent of Their 40-Year
Careers with an Open, Unresolved Malpractice Claim, 32 HEALTH AFF. 111, 111 (2013).
73 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 62, at 370 (reporting that, of patients who were seriously
affected by medical mistakes, only 2.2% initiated claims for compensation); Studdert et al.,
Negligent Care and Malpractice, supra note 59, at 253-55 (finding that only 2.5% of patients injured
due to medical error filed a malpractice lawsuit).
74 See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NJC 223851, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4
tbl.5 (2009) (reporting that plaintiffs won only 22.7% of medical malpractice trials); David M.
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2026 (2006) [hereinafter Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments] (reporting that plaintiffs prevailed in 21% of trials). Note, however, that some losing
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recover a penny.75 Even when compensation does come, it comes slowly,76
and it is often inadequate, particularly for the catastrophically injured.77
And even when an injured patient does recover, friction costs are
substantial. For every dollar that reaches the plaintiff, another dollar is
spent getting it there.78
B. Reform Initiatives So Far
Understandably unsatisfied with the status quo, the past three decades
have witnessed a flurry of med-mal-related legislative activity. Typically
spearheaded by physician groups and liability insurers, reforms have
generally ignored (or stubbornly denied) the well-documented problems of
widespread injury and pervasive under-claiming and have instead sought to
limit physician and hospital liability. Undertaken by every state, these
initiatives have taken a number of forms, including caps on noneconomic
(and sometimes total) damages, modifications to joint and several liability,
the elimination of the collateral source rule, caps on contingency fees, the
imposition of certificate-of-merit requirements, restrictions on statutes of
limitations, and the creation of professional screening panels.79 The stated
justification for these initiatives has been to deter frivolous claims and
reduce the size and curb the unpredictability of large (often dubbed
“windfall”) payments.80 Just as important—if less often articulated—by

plaintiffs do not walk away empty-handed, as some proceed to trial against one defendant having
already settled with another. See Neil Vidmar, Juries and Medical Malpractice Claims: Empirical
Facts Versus Myths, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 367, 368 (2009).
75 WEILER ET AL., supra note 59, at 5 (reporting that approximately 60% of represented claimants “receive some settlement or award”); Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments,
supra note 74, at 2026 (reporting that, of all patients who filed a medical malpractice claim—defined
merely as a written demand for compensation—roughly 56% received compensation).
76 See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
77 See Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997, 1028-29 (1990).
78 See Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2031.
Finally, no discussion of the medical malpractice system’s woes would be complete without
noting that the system itself sometimes errs. Some injury victims with meritorious claims get
nothing, while some individuals with non-meritorious claims get paid. I address this problem
below at notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
79 For more on these initiatives, see generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of
the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2006).
80 In so doing, reformers have sought to increase physician supply, curb defensive medicine,
and lower medical malpractice insurance premiums (and, indirectly, healthcare costs). Reforms’
actual effects on the above are “mixed.” See generally Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of
Tort Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 513, 520-37 ( Jennifer
Arlen ed., 2013).
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limiting the expected value of claims (and attorneys’ fees earned thereon),
proponents have sought to dampen plaintiffs’ desire and capacity to sue.
Notwithstanding their popularity, these incremental reforms are
susceptible to serious criticism.81 For starters, traditional reforms do nothing
to help (and, in fact, likely exacerbate) the two most pressing problems
when it comes to medical injury: (1) the prevalence of medical mistakes, and
(2) the paucity of adequate compensation for those hurt. Further, to the
extent one actually believes that the worst thing about medical malpractice
is the lawsuits it engenders, when it comes to those lawsuits, existing
reforms just fiddle at the margins, leaving intact the basic structure for the
compensation of medical mistakes. To the extent the medical malpractice
system is truly broken, in other words, limiting damages doled out by juries
or capping the fees lawyers can earn does not fix the system, it merely offers
“less of the same.”82 Then, as a final kicker, to the extent existing reforms do
have an effect, that effect is unevenly, and often unfairly, felt—
disproportionately targeting those who are grievously hurt and those who
are particularly disempowered and especially vulnerable, such as women,
children, and the elderly.83
C. Health Courts: The Basics
Breaking with the status quo, health courts would offer not incremental,
but wholesale, reform,84 targeting not merely medical malpractice litigation
81 See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 3 (2005) (arguing that “the
real problem is too much medical malpractice, not too much litigation”); Michael J. Saks, Medical
Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 693, 694
(1994) (book review) (“[L]egislative reforms of the past two decades have been aimed at shielding
health care providers, especially doctors, from the principal legal device designed to deal with
accidental injuries, thereby assuring that injuries and deaths remain high and compensation
inadequate.”).
82 Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury:
Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148 (1991) (“[R]eforms need to offer a demonstrable improvement, not
merely ‘less of the same,’ like conventional tort reform’s pro-defendant changes in legal rules.”).
83 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Promoting Fairness in the Medical Malpractice System (calling certain reforms “transparently unfair”), in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 137, 142-43 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); Saks, supra note 81, at 722
(“Caps are a cruel and perverse solution.”). See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of
Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004) (finding that noneconomic damage caps impose a disproportionate burden on women, children, and the elderly);
David M. Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in
California, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 54 (finding that noneconomic damage caps most
severely restrict the compensation of those victims with the most catastrophic injuries).
84 Health courts are the most recent in a long line of scholarly calls for fundamental reorientation of the medical injury compensation system. Other bold reform proposals have called, inter
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but the far more serious epidemic of medical injury. In crafting this reform
initiative, health court architects have specifically seized on four problems
with the current system: the negligence standard, victims’ low rate of
claiming, the inaccuracy and inconsistency of judgments, and the system’s
sometimes interminable delays.85
First, health court proponents take issue with the negligence standard,
which traditionally governs lawsuits alleging medical injury. This standard,
they say, defies easy administration, contributing to decisional inaccuracy; is
fundamentally misdirected, as many medical injuries arise not from the
personal “fault” of any individual physician but rather from broader
“systems failures” within hospitals and healthcare organizations;86 and,
owing to its connotation of “moral misbehavior,” inhibits physicians’
willingness to disclose errors, which, in turn, impairs providers’ ability to
learn from their mistakes.87
alia, for states to adopt enterprise liability, see, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler,
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV.
381, 398-401 (1994), and base liability on contract, rather than tort, principles, see, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case For Contract, 76 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 93-94 (1976).
Health courts themselves are an outgrowth of two earlier proposals. The first called for the
creation of an administrative entity to resolve liability disputes pursuant to a list of “compensable
events.” Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, “Medical Adversity Insurance”—A No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK Q. 125, 131-34 (1973). The
second, from the AMA, sited adjudications within “an expert administrative agency,” altered
applicable legal standards, and curtailed damages. MEDICAL LIABILITY PROJECT, AM. MED.
ASS’N / SPECIALITY SOC’Y, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR
RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM at i,
17-60 (1988). Health courts differ from these other reform ideas, in part, because they have
actually made the leap out of the academy and into policy debates and (to a lesser extent) popular
consciousness.
85 A number of health court proposals exist, and plans vary on the particulars. The foregoing
discussion attempts to distill the core features of the leading plans, focusing, when possible, on the
model set forth in Michelle M. Mello et al., “Health Courts” and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84
MILBANK Q. 459 (2006) [hereinafter Mello et al., “Health Courts”]. For a detailed discussion of
how various plans differ, see generally Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5, at 15-28.
86 See INST. OF MED., supra note 62, at 49 (“The problem is not bad people; the problem is
that the system needs to be made safer.”).
87 On this latter point, health court proponents reason: (1) we cannot reduce mistakes without disclosing them, (2) the tort system’s naming and blaming culture inhibits disclosure, and (3)
the “avoidability” standard, by eliminating any connotation of moral misbehavior, would
encourage physicians to reveal, and learn from, their mistakes. See, e.g., Mello et al., “Health
Courts,” supra note 85, at 472-74. Not surprisingly, others are not convinced. Some question the
syllogism’s second step, arguing that, rather than inhibiting disclosure, medical malpractice
lawsuits “reveal[] valuable information about weaknesses in hospital policies, practices, providers,
and administration.” Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1224, 1224 (2013). Zeroing in on the third step in the syllogism, others show that
there is little evidence that error reporting fluctuates alongside the threat of liability. See, e.g.,
George J. Annas, The Patient’s Right to Safety—Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation
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Second, health court proponents target medical malpractice victims’
very low rate of claiming (of 2% to 3%) and seek to expand the pool of
compensated claimants, while limiting payouts thereto. Broadening
compensation, proponents say, would be both salutary in its own right (in
keeping with tort’s compensation ambition) and would also amplify tort’s
(currently muffled) deterrent signal.88 Reduced payouts, they reason, are
needed to keep costs from skyrocketing.89
Third, health court proponents aim their fire at the medical malpractice
system’s “unreliable” judgments, which they liken to a lottery—or worse.90
According to health court advocates, many of the most serious problems
plaguing the medical malpractice system have their roots in decisional
inaccuracy and inconsistency. This lack of reliability, they say, contributes to
defensive medicine (as doctors, uncertain about what care is required, pile
on unnecessary precautions) and also interferes with the tort system’s ability
to deter mistakes (as physicians believe that litigation outcomes are
untethered to the underlying merit of the claim).91 Thus, health court
proponents seek to “eliminate,” or at least dramatically reduce, decisional
disparities.92 This they would accomplish by basing decisions, whenever

Against Hospitals, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2065 (2006) (pointing out that error reporting
rates are similar in the United States and New Zealand); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver,
Believing Six Improbable Things: Medical Malpractice and “Legal Fear,” 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
107, 110 (2004) (“[T]he empirical literature indicates that there is massive underreporting of errors
throughout the health care system, regardless of the level of liability risk that providers face.”);
Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1633, 1635 (2002) (“No link
between [error] reporting and litigation has ever been demonstrated.”).
88 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 (“A primary goal of health court
proposals is to expand the pool of injured patients who are eligible for compensation.”). For how
infrequent claiming muffles tort’s deterrent signal, see Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan,
Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595,
1618-20 (2002).
89 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 470 (“Although more claims would be
filed, the average award would likely be considerably lower.”). Curbing payouts also eradicates
windfall awards and promotes horizontal equity. See id. at 469-70.
90 For proponents’ assertions about the system’s unreliability (as well as a critique of certain
overheated rhetoric), see infra subsection IV.A.2.
91 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 469, 472 (“[T]he malpractice case tends
to be compared to a lightning strike as simply a random event not associated with quality.”). For
the link between unpredictability and defensive medicine, see Philip K. Howard, Special Health
Courts: The Cure for Defensive Medicine, ATLANTIC (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2010/02/specialhealthcourtsthecurefordefensivemedicine/36564,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Y69D-CWH4.
92 See Howard, supra note 17 (asserting that “unreliable justice” can “be eliminated by creating specialized administrative health courts”); accord UDELL & KENDALL, supra note 11, at 4 (“The
health court system would thus provide an essential benefit where our current system of medical
justice fails: it would provide consistent, rational rulings . . . .”); Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra
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possible, in objective evidence and vesting decisionmaking authority in
trained and specialized experts.93
Fourth and finally, health court proponents zero in on the sometimes
interminable delays that attend contemporary medical malpractice
litigation. Charging that these delays exacerbate stress on doctors, deny
compensation to needy and deserving claimants, encourage malingering,
complicate insurance pricing, and impede physicians’ efforts to learn from
their mistakes, health court architects seek to speed up case resolution
considerably.94 In fact, proponents assert, health courts would resolve cases
within one year of the date of filing.95
To achieve the above objectives, health courts would alter the traditional
tort system in seven fundamental respects. First and most importantly,
health courts would alter the substantive standard pursuant to which
physicians and hospitals are judged, substituting a new “avoidability”
standard for negligence. Straddling strict liability and negligence, this
“avoidability” standard would render compensable all injuries that would
not have occurred but for the physician’s failure to follow “best practices” or
the hospital’s failure to impose “an optimal system of care.”96 (This differs
from the negligence standard, which turns on whether a physician’s care fell
below the “customary,” rather than the “best,” standard within the
profession.)
Second, health courts would impose on hospitals a new outreach
obligation. Health courts would compel hospitals to determine whether each
patient’s iatrogenic injury (injury arising out of medical treatment) was
avoidable and, if it was, to notify the patient of his or her possible
note 85, at 469 (suggesting that health court innovations will “reduce the incidence of liability
determinations that do not match the underlying merits of the claim”).
93 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461, 465.
94 See William M. Sage, Malpractice Reform as a Health Policy Problem (cataloging these concerns), in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 30, 37.
95 See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2 (suggesting
that a key principle for health court architects is that resolution should be “expeditious . . . with a
goal of resolving all claims within one year from the filing date”); COMMON GOOD, supra note 1,
at 5 (“Most cases would be resolved within months.”); Philip K. Howard, Beyond Obamacare: How
to Fix Our Enormous, Inefficient Health-Care System, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/beyondobamacarehowtofixourenormousinefficienthealthcaresystem/256765, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y8R-B6FD (“Patients
injured by mistakes can get justice within a year, not the five years it takes today.”); accord Mello
et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85 at 465 (predicting that, even if cases are contested, the ALJ
could hold a hearing and “make a decision within a few weeks”).
96 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461, 464, 474. Not all who endorse health
courts accept the avoidability standard. The AMA, for instance, would retain negligence as the
threshold for patient compensation. See AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES, supra
note 9, at 2.
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entitlement to relief.97 (Currently, despite various exhortations to share this
information, such notifications are exceptional.98)
Third, health courts would limit damage awards. Though health courts
would continue to reimburse victims’ entire economic loss,99 these tribunals
would eliminate the collateral source rule (thereby excluding compensation
for expenses covered by other plans, programs, or health insurance)100 and
award noneconomic damages only pursuant to a schedule or sliding scale
tied to injury severity.101
Fourth, health courts would create a new layer of pre-adjudication expert
review. Immediately upon a claim’s receipt, health courts would compel the
hospital or physician’s insurer (the “respondent”) to convene a group of
neutral experts to review the claim and render a judgment as to its
compensability. If this “expert panel” determined that the claim was entitled
to compensation, it would supply the claimant an offer of compensation; if
not, the expert panel would provide “a written report” outlining reasons for
its denial.102 If either the claimant or the health care provider were

97 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 462. To ensure compliance, health courts
could impose fines or “surcharges” on hospitals that shirk their notification obligation. Id. For
more on this reporting obligation, see Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5, at 63-65.
98 See Andrews, supra note 62, at 371.
99 Most health court plans envision the full recovery of economic loss. See, e.g., AM. COLL.
OF PHYSICIANS, EXPLORING THE USE OF HEALTH COURTS—ADDENDUM TO “REFORMING
THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SYSTEM” 6 (2006) (stating that the “ACP strongly
supports a health court model that pays 100% of the patient’s economic damages”); AM. MED.
ASS’N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 2; Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note
85, at 467 (indicating that health courts would award full economic damages, subject to a
collateral-source offset rule); Howard, supra note 15 (“With a special health court, damages would
consist of all lost income and medical costs . . . .”). Some, however, envision cabining both
economic and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Barringer, supra note 13 at 247-48 (describing a
“schedule of benefits” for both economic and noneconomic damages); UDELL & KENDALL, supra
note 11, at 11 (same).
100 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 467. A caveat is that this may be easier said
than done, as federal law protects the status of certain entities as secondary payors. See David M.
Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical
Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 251 (2001) (cautioning that “fairly wellestablished statutory and common law will restrict opportunities for state sponsors of no-fault
experimentation programs to adopt offset arrangements against Medicare and Medicaid as a
means for saving resources”).
101 Proponents explain: “The schedule would consist of a number of injury-severity tiers
based on an existing injury-severity scale . . . . Dollar value ranges (both floors and ceilings) would
be assigned to each tier based on decision-science research about how the public values various
utility losses and public deliberation about reasonable compensation.” Mello et al., “Health Courts,”
supra note 85, at 468 (citation omitted).
102 Id. at 464.
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dissatisfied with the expert panel’s eligibility determination or damage
calculation, a formal health court adjudication would ensue.103
Fifth, in the course of these adjudications, health courts would take two
new steps to promote predictability. First, and most fundamentally, health
courts would remove medical malpractice cases from generalized courts and
locate them, instead, in a specialized tribunal overseen by an ALJ schooled
in, and devoted to, medical injuries.104 Appointed by a board assembled by
the governor or other appropriate body, these ALJs “would have special
training and experience in medical matters, but would not typically be
trained as physicians.”105 Meanwhile, health courts would arm ALJs with
decision aids dubbed “accelerated compensation events” (ACEs). Identified
ex ante by an expert body (and periodically updated as new evidence
becomes available), ACEs would identify certain injuries that would not
typically occur if a doctor provided optimal care. If a claimant sustained an
injury matching “the specifications and clinical circumstances of an item on
an ACE list,” she would be adjudged presumptively eligible for
compensation, thus eliminating individual fact-finding.106
Sixth, health courts would take steps to abridge and expedite
proceedings: Live hearings would be convened only at a party’s or the ALJ’s
request, and hearings themselves would be simplified; evidence, for
example, would be admitted pursuant to “basic but relaxed” rules.107
Last but not least, health courts would limit appeals and regulate
payments to petitioners’ counsel. Though either party could appeal—first to
a higher-level administrative tribunal, then to a judicial court—this review
would be limited: The ALJ’s decision would be affirmed unless it was
“arbitrary and capricious.”108 Meanwhile, in regards to payments to
petitioners’ counsel: “Claimants would pay their attorneys on a contingent
basis (i.e., only if the claim resulted in a compensation payment), but the

103
104
105
106

See id.
See Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
For a description of ACEs, see Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461, 466-67;
Tancredi & Bovbjerg, supra note 82, at 149-53. It is not clear what proportion of cases ACEs
would cover. Cf. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ROBERT A. BERENSON, URBAN INST., SURMOUNTING MYTHS AND MINDSETS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8 (2005), available at
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411227_medical_malpractice.pdf (suggesting that
“[a]voidable classes of events (ACEs) would probably cover most injuries”).
107 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465.
108 Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 69.
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fee would be based on a multiple of hours worked rather than a percentage
of the award.”109
Figure 1 below offers a visual depiction of claims’ path through the
health court system.
Figure 1: Health Court Process
Injury – Hospital must notify
patient and insurer

Victim files claim with physician’s or hospital’s insurer
Compensable

Not Compensable
Expert Panel
Decision
Explanation of decision

Offer of compensation
If Unsatisfactory
Compensable

If Unsatisfactory
Health Court
(ALJ Decision)

Damage Award

Not Compensable

Explanation of decision

If Unsatisfactory

If Unsatisfactory
Appeal to administrative tribunal, then
judicial courts

109 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 463. Other health court proponents have
rejected this lodestar idea, in favor of contingency fees subject to a 20% cap. See COMMON GOOD,
supra note 1, at 5.
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II. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE VICP
Today, reformers complain that the medical malpractice system is too
selective in its compensation, too unpredictable in its decisions, and too
slow in its judgments—and they hold up specialized courts as the muchneeded cure. As we shall see, in the mid-1980s, many voiced near-identical
complaints about the vaccine injury litigation environment. And, like health
court proponents, policymakers settled on a specialized court as the
necessary reform.
A. Origins: Mounting Dissatisfaction and Litigation’s Rising Tide
Vaccines are a triumph of modern medicine.110 Yet for all the good they
do and all the lives they save, vaccines cause a small proportion of those
inoculated to sustain grievous, and sometimes fatal, injury. These side
effects received little attention until the 1970s when three unrelated events
seemed to conspire to unsettle the status quo. The first was the “notably
troublesome” case of Anita Reyes.111 While an infant living near the
Mexican border, Reyes received a dose of Wyeth’s polio vaccine and, shortly
thereafter, contracted polio, resulting in her near-complete paralysis. Her
parents initiated suit on her behalf, a jury ruled in her favor, and, in 1974,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.112 Both the Fifth Circuit’s holding and its
reasoning were, for vaccine companies, ominous. Reyes v. Wyeth, that is,
substantially expanded liability for vaccine manufacturers and also explicitly
invoked enterprise liability principles to justify that expansion—suggesting
that, going forward, between victims and vaccine manufacturers, the latter
should bear the loss.113
110 “For each group of vaccinated children born during a given year [in the United States], an
estimated . . . 33,500 premature deaths are prevented over the course of a lifetime.” Press Release,
CDC, Most U.S. Parents are Vaccinating According to New CDC Survey: Vaccine Coverage
Rates for Children Remain High (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel
/2008/r080904.htm.
111 Edmund W. Kitch, Vaccines and Product Liability: A Case of Contagious Litigation, REG.,
May–June 1985, at 11, 12.
112 Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
113 Even if the manufacturer was not at fault, the court reasoned, “a strong argument can be
advanced that the loss ought not lie where it falls (on the victim), but should be borne by the
manufacturer as a foreseeable cost of doing business.” Id. at 1294. In terms of doctrine, the court
carved out a new exception to the learned intermediary rule, holding that Wyeth should have
warned Anita or her parents (not just the nurse who administered the vaccine), even though the
polio vaccine was not administered as part of a mass immunization program. See id. at 1277. In so
doing, it was later said, the Reyes court “seeded the clouds for a downpour of litigation.” ARTHUR
ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST LIFESAVER 266
(2007).
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Then, on the heels of the Reyes decision, came the swine flu faux
epidemic of 1976. There, forty-five million Americans (one-third of the
adult population) subjected themselves to a flu shot at President Gerald
Ford’s stern urging only to learn, later, that the flu was not particularly
dangerous, but the shot itself was—causing in some small proportion of
patients Guillain-Barré syndrome, a usually reversible but occasionally fatal
form of paralysis. A flood of litigation and withering press attention
followed.114
Rounding out this troubling trilogy, on April 19, 1982, an NBC affiliate
aired an Emmy-winning, hour-long television documentary titled DPT:
Vaccine Roulette.115 With footage of dead infants and convulsing children, the
broadcast charged that the pertussis component in the DTP vaccine (which
protects against whooping cough) had not been adequately tested and could
cause “damage to a devastating degree.”116 Publicity from the program
resulted in the immediate formation of a citizens lobby called Dissatisfied
Parents Together, kicked off congressional hearings into the pertussis
vaccine’s safety, and, more generally, stirred growing skepticism about the
broader vaccination project.117
Whether buoyed by the Reyes decision, emboldened by the swine flu
debacle, or galvanized by the Vaccine Roulette documentary, it is clear that,
starting in the early 1980s, those hurt following vaccination started filing
suit, for the first time, in significant numbers. In 1980, only twenty-four
suits were filed alleging vaccine injury; by 1985, that number had spiraled
upward to 144.118 Indeed, in 1985 alone, plaintiffs filed a total of 100 lawsuits
against just one manufacturer, Lederle Laboratories, claiming injury
114 For more on this episode, which generated some 1600 lawsuits (all of which, for complicated reasons, were lodged against the United States), see Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp.
1188 (D. Colo. 1980); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU
AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE (1978); David Brown, A Shot in the Dark:
Swine Flu’s Vaccine Lessons, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A9.
115 DPT: Vaccine Roulette (NBC television broadcast Apr. 19, 1982). The vaccine protects
against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. Though many call the vaccine DPT, DTP is the
abbreviation utilized by the Vaccine Injury Table (and therefore herein). See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3
(2014).
116 Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for
the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 839 (1988); see also ALLEN, supra note 113, at 251.
117 See ALLEN, supra note 113, at 251-55. Though the documentary first aired on an NBC
affiliate, it was later shown on the NBC program Today. Within three weeks of the program’s
transmission, a Senate Subcommittee held its first hearing on the pertussis vaccine’s safety and
efficacy. See id. at 278.
118 See Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Catherine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensation for Unavoidable Injuries: Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 277, 297 n.126 (1991).
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following the administration of its DTP vaccine, which eclipsed the number
of lawsuits filed against Lederle in the previous three years combined.119
As the number of lawsuits ticked upward, so did manufacturers’ dismay.
In 1984, for example, Lederle’s President went on record declaring that
“[t]he present dollar demand of DTP lawsuits against Lederle is 200 times
greater than our total sales of DTP vaccine in 1983.”120 Then, the following
year, he complained the situation had deteriorated: “All but two of the more
than ninety” DTP cases filed against Lederle—in more than forty years of
distributing the vaccine—had been filed since 1982.121 Another vaccine
manufacturer—Connaught Laboratories—faced a similar plight, as suits
filed against it in 1985 and 1986 sought a combined billion dollars in
damages.122
Spooked by this increased liability, some manufacturers raised their
prices—the wholesale price of the DTP vaccine increased some 6000%
during the period—while others exited the market altogether.123 1984 was a
particularly eventful year in this regard. On June 13, 1984, Wyeth announced
it was stopping production of its whooping cough vaccine after thirty years
of production, blaming “dramatic increases in the cost of participating in
this market.”124 Then, six months later, Connaught also announced plans to
stop the vaccine’s production, citing a sharp increase in the cost of insurance
against lawsuits—a decision The New York Times dubbed a “side effect of the
side effects.”125
As manufacturers ceased production, possible vaccine shortages loomed,
and physicians and public health officials warned of the potential return of
epidemic infectious disease. Said Martin H. Smith of the American
119 See Funding of the Childhood Vaccine Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 16 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House
Hearing] (statement of Dennis E. Ross, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury).
120 Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearings on H.R. 5810 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the
Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 229 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 House
Hearings] (statement of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Labs.).
121 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 827 Before the Sen.
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 99th Cong. 245 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearing] (statement of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Labs.).
122 See 1987 House Hearing, supra note 119, at 104 (letter from David J. Williams, Vice President & General Manager, Connaught Labs.).
123 See Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines,
37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 248 (1994) (reporting that the wholesale price of the DTP vaccine “increased
by over 6,000 percent from 1970 to 1987”).
124 Philip M. Boffey, Vaccine Liability Threatens Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1984, at C1.
125 Richard Levine, Risk Forces Out Vaccine Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1984, at E7. Subsequently, on April 25, 1985, Connaught resumed DTP distribution. See 1985 Senate Hearing, supra
note 121, at 265 (statement of David J. Williams, Vice President & General Manager, Connaught
Labs.).

1658

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1631

Academy of Pediatrics in 1984: “At the present time, we are sitting on an
explosive situation and it could have a short fuse.”126 Seemingly validating
Smith’s dire warning, on December 13, 1984, the CDC requested that
doctors postpone DTP “booster shots” for older children in order to ensure
an adequate supply for infants.127 And by 1986, the number of DTP
manufacturers had dwindled from eight to two,128 while vaccines for
measles, mumps, and rubella (the MMR vaccine) and polio were made by
only a single manufacturer,129 prompting Congress to observe that “the
withdrawal of even a single manufacturer would present the very real
possibility of vaccine shortages, and, in turn, increasing numbers of
unimmunized children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable
diseases.”130
On the other side of the “v,” meanwhile, parents of vaccine-injured
children were themselves unsatisfied. True, throughout the 1980s, more
parents were suing. But many of these suits ended in defeat, as plaintiffs
could not necessarily pinpoint which manufacturer made a particular child’s
vaccine, and, even if they could, often faltered when it came time to prove
that the vaccine was, in fact, defective or the injury was actually caused by
the vaccine at issue.131 Moreover, even when compensation did come, it
came slowly, after wrenching delays and often bitter litigation. As Congress
explained, “Lawsuits and settlement negotiations can take months and even
years to complete. Transaction costs—including attorneys’ fees and court
payments—are high. And in the end, no recovery may be available. Yet
futures have been destroyed and mounting expenses must be met.”132
B. The Legislative Solution: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
By 1986, as worries about a litigation “crisis” swirled, manufacturers’
demand for protection grew more insistent, and parents’ pleas for more
126 1984 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 119 (statement of Martin H. Smith, PresidentElect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics).
127 See Elizabeth Wehr, Concern in Congress: Looming Vaccine Shortage Blamed on Threat of
Lawsuits, 42 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3146, 3146 (1984).
128 See Dark, supra note 116, at 801.
129 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986).
130 Id. To be sure, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that vaccine manufacturers, eager
for liability protection, were exaggerating the precariousness of their plight and that price hikes
and vaccine shortages were orchestrated to force Congress’s hand. See Amy Tarr, DTP Vaccine
Injuries: Who Should Pay?, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 1 (“[S]ome plaintiffs’ lawyers charge that the
move to scale down production of the [DTP] vaccine is little more than an industry effort to
blackmail Congress and the public.”).
131 For more on challenges facing plaintiffs, see 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 4.
132 H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6.
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reliable, predictable, and prompt compensation gained urgency, the table
was set for a legislative solution.133 In time, Congress obliged. The final
legislation was, to be sure, nobody’s ideal. As Representative Henry
Waxman, the Act’s chief sponsor, explained in the summer of 1986:
I recognize that the bill I have introduced is probably not the first choice of
most parties to this controversy. Manufacturers would undoubtedly prefer
greater insulation from liability. Parents of injured children would certainly
prefer larger compensation and fewer restrictions on court activity. The
Reagan administration would, I am sure, prefer legislation that spends no
money.134

Yet with just enough for all stakeholders, the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act ultimately received broad and bipartisan support, passing on the
final hours of the 99th Congress.135
As enacted, the Vaccine Act had two parts. Part one (less important for
our current purposes) sought to upgrade the nation’s immunization program
by perfecting vaccines and monitoring adverse reactions thereto.136 Part two,
meanwhile, sought to shield manufacturers from tort liability, while
providing “simple justice” to vaccine-injured children.137 Toward that end,
Congress established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), a
no-fault scheme run out of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and jointly
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
(which serves as the respondent and therefore represents the Fund’s
133 Congress may also have been influenced by legislative activity, both here and abroad.
California created a limited compensation program to provide modest benefits to vaccine-injured
children in 1977, and by 1986, a number of other nations, including Germany, France, Switzerland,
Denmark, Japan, and the United Kingdom, also provided payments to vaccine-injured children.
See Wendy K. Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-Related Injury Abroad: A Comparative
Analysis, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599, 605-07 (1987).
134 Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1780, H.R. 4777, and H.R. 5184 Before the
Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong. 2 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman); accord Henry A. Waxman, When a Vaccine Injures a Child:
A No-Fault Way to Compensate, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1986, at A27 (declaring the legislation a
“compromise bill” supported by “[a] broad array of conservatives and liberals, consumer advocates
and pharmaceutical lobbyists”).
135 For more on the Act’s enactment, see BURKE, supra note 36, at 142-70.
136 See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, sec. 311(a),
§§ 2101–2106, 100 Stat. 3755, 3756-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -6 (2012)).
137 National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearing on S. 2117 Before the S. Comm.
on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 290-91 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Senate Hearing] (statement of
Sen. Paula Hawkins) (“[T]hese children have an urgent need and deserve simple justice quickly.”); Martin H. Smith, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, 82 PEDIATRICS 264,
269 (1988) (“The intent of the Academy for years has been to secure a better and simpler form of
justice for children as well as to ensure a more secure vaccine supply.”).

1660

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1631

interests in all VICP proceedings) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
(which represents HHS).138 Financed by a seventy-five-cent excise tax on
each vaccine dose administered (which creates the Fund upon which injury
victims draw), the VICP is intended to provide adequate, though abridged,
compensation to all individuals injured by covered vaccines via “lessadversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding[s].”139
C. The VICP: The Basics
To mete out this “simple justice,” the VICP utilizes procedures
strikingly similar to the procedures health courts would employ. Below,
Section II.C outlines the VICP’s core features. Then, Part III reviews the
myriad ways in which health courts and the VICP are alike.
First, the VICP replaces tort’s negligence standard with a standard of
strict liability. Pursuant to this standard, the petitioner is entitled to
compensation as long as her injuries were more likely than not caused or
significantly aggravated by a covered vaccine. She need not show that the
doctor erred in the vaccine’s administration or preparation, that the vaccine
was accompanied by an inadequate warning, or that the vaccine itself was
defectively manufactured or designed. This means that the Vaccine Act
winnows down a traditional tort action so that, instead of the many
elements typically considered, only two must be addressed: (1) actual
causation (did this vaccine cause this injury?) and (2) damages (how much
compensation is due?).
Then, having winnowed down the inquiry to just two elements, the
Vaccine Act simplifies proof for each. Causation questions are simplified by
the Vaccine Injury Table—an innovative decision aid designed “to remove
much of the burden of proof required in traditional tort proceedings.”140
Initially created by Congress, and periodically amended by the Secretary of
HHS, the Table lists all covered vaccines, as well as the injuries widely
recognized as caused thereby, alongside a specific timeframe for each
injury’s onset.141 If a claimant can show that she suffered an injury listed on
the Table within the time period specified (so, for example, that she suffered
138 For more on the VICP’s funding and personnel, see MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET
AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, SPECIALIZED DECISION MAKERS, AND
CASE-MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION
PROGRAM 11-12 (1998).
139 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1), (d)(2)(A) (2012).
140 H.R. REP. NO. 106-977, at 8 (2000).
141 For more on the Table’s creation, see JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 13-14. For the

Table itself, see 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2014). For information on Table modifications, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-14(c) and infra Section V.B.
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anaphylaxis within four hours of receiving the DTP vaccine), she will have
suffered an “on-Table” injury. On-Table injuries are presumed to have been
caused by the vaccine and are thus presumptively entitled to compensation.
HHS (serving as respondent) may rebut this presumption, but it bears the
burden of doing so.142 Only if an injury falls outside the Table must the
traditional actual cause question be addressed.
Free-wheeling damages calculations are also avoided. Compensation in
the event of a vaccine-related death is automatically set at $250,000,143 while
payments to injured claimants are also standardized. Injured claimants, that
is, are entitled to (1) lost wages, (2) payment for pain and suffering, and (3)
actual medical and rehabilitation expenses. But, of those three damage
categories, only the third (medical and rehabilitation expenses) is
consistently calculated on an individualized basis. Minors’ lost wages are
pegged to the average gross weekly earnings of workers in the private, nonfarm sector,144 while damages for pain and suffering payments are capped at
$250,000.145
In addition to simplifying the questions to be addressed, the Vaccine Act
alters the site of injury adjudication. As in health courts, entitlement and
compensation decisions are relocated from generalist courts to specialized,
dedicated tribunals, as decisional authority is vested in eight special masters
(seven associates and one chief ), who serve renewable four-year terms and
work in (and are appointed by judges on) the U.S. Court of Claims.146
Considered “experts,” these special masters work exclusively on vaccine
cases and are, according to Congress, to be “well-advised on matters of
health, medicine, and public health.”147
142
143

42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (establishing damages in the event of a vaccine-related death). As of
2006, deaths accounted for roughly 14% of VICP claims. See Geoffrey Evans, Update on Vaccine
Liability in the United States: Presentation at the National Vaccine Program Office Workshop on
Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States, 12 February 2002, 42
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S130, S133 (2006).
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B) (simplifying calculation of minors’ lost wages). Adults
are entitled to their “actual and anticipated loss of earnings.” Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A).
145 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(4).
146 Because terms are renewable, some special masters serve for long periods. For example,
one associate special master has served since 1991. See Laura D. Millman, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/laura-d-millman (last visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/H4YA-ZTBQ.
147 H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 515 (1989) (Conf. Rep.); see Munn v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declaring that, because special masters are
“experts,” they shall be entitled to the “statutory deference in fact-finding normally reserved for
specialized agencies”). For more on special masters’ qualifications, see JOHNSON ET AL., supra
note 138, at 14-15.
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Furthermore, the Vaccine Act seeks, to the extent possible, to root
decisions in scientific evidence—to base decisions on experts’ interpretation
of the leading scientific literature.148 This ambition is clearly evident in the
Vaccine Act’s creation of, and reliance on, the Vaccine Injury Table
(discussed above). It is also evident in the Act’s delegation of decisional
authority to eight special masters who are schooled in, and devoted to, the
resolution of vaccine-injury claims. It is apparent in other innovations as
well. Namely, as in health courts, experts are called upon to assess claims’
scientific validity—and chart claims’ course—from the very beginning. As
soon as a VICP petition is filed, that is, the petition is routed to HHS for
evaluation by a medical expert within HHS’s Division of Vaccine Injury
Compensation (DVIC). This expert reviews the petition and determines
whether it meets medical criteria for compensation. If he or she concludes it
does and the DOJ concurs, the petition will be conceded, and, with the
special master’s permission, will move directly to the damages phase.149
Only if the DVIC expert determines that the petition does not meet the
medical criteria for compensation will an adjudication ensue. Then, once a
hearing is in full swing, expert opinion can again be sought: Congress has
empowered—and encouraged—special masters to retain neutral experts to
inform their consideration of complex medical questions.150
The VICP also takes many steps to abridge and expedite proceedings.
Or, as two commentators have explained: “The overriding guideline of
th[e]se proceedings is simplification.”151 Toward that end, the Vaccine Act
148 DIVISION OF VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN 24 (2006) [hereinafter DVIC STRATEGIC PLAN]

(stating that a “strength” of the VICP is that the program “endeavors to be science-based in its
assessment of claims”).
149 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: A PROGRAM REVIEW 4 (1992); 1999
GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 30.
150 Congress has declared that special masters would “be well-advised to retain independent
medical experts to assist in the evaluation of medical issues.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 513
(1989). Despite Congress’s exhortation, in practice, few special masters retain independent
experts. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE UNDER THE
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 26 (2014) (“In unusual instances,
special masters may suggest the hiring of a neutral medical expert to render an opinion on a
medical dispute, such as the appropriate diagnosis or prognosis.”); JOHNSON ET AL., supra note
138, at 32-33 (reporting that, of interviewed special masters, none “had . . . actually appointed an
expert” and providing tentative explanations for special masters’ forbearance, including special
masters’ respect for the adversarial system, their uncertainty of how to locate and compensate a
court-appointed expert, and their heavy reliance on medical textbooks (which potentially take
independent experts’ place)).
151 Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986:
An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 394 (1987).
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discards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits neither pretrial
discovery nor cross-examination as of right, relaxes rules for the admission
of evidence, and eliminates the need to provide live testimony (instead
permitting the parties to introduce evidence by affidavit, sworn declaration,
or via telephone or videotape).152 Rather than sitting passively on the
sidelines, the Act empowers special masters to take an active, inquisitorial
role—to question witnesses, demand additional documentation, and inform
parties what further proof is necessary to facilitate case resolution.153 And
finally, the Act tops off its desire for speed with a hard deadline: By statute,
special masters “shall” issue decisions within 240 days of the petition’s filing,
exclusive of suspended time.154
At the tail end of litigation, the VICP limits appeals and cabins
payments to petitioners’ counsel. Within the VICP, either party (HHS or
the petitioner) may appeal—first to the U.S. Court of Claims, then to the
Federal Circuit. Appeals, however, proceed pursuant to a highly deferential
standard of review: Special masters’ findings of fact and conclusions of law
are set aside only if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”155 Petitioners’ counsel, meanwhile, is
compensated via a unique payment mechanism. The VICP compensates
petitioners’ counsel out of the Fund via a lodestar calculation (reasonable
hours worked times a reasonable hourly wage) and will do so even if the
petitioner fails in his quest to obtain compensation. The sole requirement is
that the petition was brought pursuant to a “reasonable basis” and “in good
faith.”156
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(v) (2012) (limiting discovery and granting the special
master discretion to conduct hearings); id. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(B) (advising that evidence is to be
admitted pursuant to “flexible and informal standards”); see also OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS,
supra note 150, at 41 (offering alternatives to live testimony).
153 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 513 (“The system is intended to allow the proceedings to be
conducted in what has come to be known as an ‘inquisitorial’ format, with the Master conducting
discovery (as needed), cross-examination (as needed), and investigation.”).
154 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii). As initially enacted, the Act set a 365-day deadline. See
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, sec. 311(a), § 2112, 100 Stat.
3755, 3762. Congress subsequently amended that provision to require judgment within 240 days in
most cases. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, sec. 6601, § 2112,
103 Stat. 2106, 2288 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii)). If a special master fails to
enter judgment within the prescribed period, the petitioner may withdraw her petition and file the
action in state or federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(g). It appears, however, that “petitioners
rarely exercise this option.” 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 12.
155 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B); see also Hibbard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 100
Fed. Cl. 742, 749 (2011) (“If the special master’s decision is based on evidence in the record that is
not wholly implausible, the Court will uphold the finding as not being arbitrary and capricious.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
156 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B).
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Finally, at a case’s conclusion, the Vaccine Act supplies a tort opt-out
provision. Specifically, the Act compels all individuals with vaccine-injury
claims to first adjudicate their claims within the VICP. But the Act also
gives unsatisfied petitioners the right to reject the special master’s judgment
and file a traditional tort claim against the vaccine manufacturer or
healthcare provider in state or federal court, where the claim is considered
anew. This tort opt-out provision, however, is very narrow, as the Act both
restricts the kind of claims that can be asserted and limits the damages that
may be awarded. Specifically, per the 2011 Supreme Court ruling in
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, the Vaccine Act preempts all design defect claims
against vaccine manufacturers.157 And, the Act unambiguously creates a
presumption of adequacy for all warnings that comply with FDA standards
(thereby preventing state courts from performing an independent
assessment of a warning’s sufficiency),158 codifies the “learned intermediary
doctrine” (thereby eliminating claims based on the vaccine manufacturer’s
failure to furnish direct warnings to patients),159 and erects a heightened
standard for the provision of punitive damages.160
Figure 2 offers a visual depiction of a petition’s path through the VICP
system.

157
158
159
160

131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011).
See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(2).
Id. § 300aa-22(c).
Id. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (barring punitive damages except if the manufacturer engaged in
fraud, intentional wrongdoing, or other illegal activity).
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Figure 2: VICP Process
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III. A CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL DÉJÀ VU: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN
HEALTH COURTS AND THE VICP
As should by now be clear, health courts and the VICP share underlying
motivations and critical characteristics. This Part will review the two
reforms’ many similarities (and highlight their occasional differences) to
show, ultimately, that a study of the VICP sheds light on health courts’
likely performance upon adoption. To begin, Table 1 offers a visual
depiction of the two systems’ key characteristics, with the systems’ few
differences highlighted in gray.
Table 1: Similarities and Differences Between the VICP and Health Courts

Eligibility

VICP

Health Courts

Severity threshold
excludes those with
minor injuries?

Yes
(Injury lasts six
months or results
in hospital stay,
surgery, or death)

Yes
(Claimant misses
four weeks of
work or incurs
$3000+ in medical
costs)

Outreach to
potential claimants?

Yes
(HHS to inform
public; attorneys
have ethical
obligation to
advise)

Yes
(Hospitals must
notify patients of
avoidable
iatrogenic injury)

Respondent(s)

HHS,
represented by
DOJ

Physician(s) and
Hospital(s)
(sometimes
multiple)

Specialized
adjudicators?

Yes
(Special Masters)

Yes
(ALJs)

Juries?

No

No

Petitioner must
prove fault?

No

Kind of
(“Avoidability”)

Petitioner must
prove causation?

Yes

Yes

Personnel

Proof
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VICP

Health Courts

Decision aid fasttracks claims
involving signature
events?

Yes
(Table)

Yes
(ACEs)

Respondent’s
response to claim
informed by expert
review?

Yes
(DVIC Expert)

Yes
(“Expert Panel”)

Adjudicator
empowered to hire
neutral experts?

Yes

Yes

Relaxed rules of
evidence and
procedure?

Yes

Yes

All decisions
published?

Yes

Yes

Yes
Full economic loss
(though death
(subject to
abrogation of CSR)? benefits
and minors’
lost wages
standardized)

Yes

Limit on
noneconomic
damages?

Yes
($250,000 cap)

Yes
(sliding scale)

Appeals permitted?

Yes
(U.S. Ct. of Fed.
Claims then Fed.
Cir.)

Yes
(Admin. panel
then
judicial court)

Deferential
appellate standard
of review?

Yes
(“Arbitrary and
Capricious”)

Yes
(“Arbitrary and
Capricious”)

Appeals

Petitioner’s attorney Yes
Attorney
(From VICP
compensated via
Compensation
Fund)
lodestar?

Yes
(From Claimant)
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VICP

Health Courts

Petitioner’s attorney Yes
No
paid if claim denied? (subject to limited
exception)
Exclusive
Remedy

Tribunal exclusive
remedy?

No
(limited tort optout provision)

Yes

A. Similarities, Revisited
As Parts I and II suggested and Table 1 illustrates, health courts and the
VICP share many similarities. They both address similar claims: serious
personal injury claims of those injured in the course of a medical
intervention.161 These claims raise similar questions, generate similar
conflicts, and compel the consideration of similar evidence. And indeed,
rather than mere similarity, there is actual overlap between claims within
the two systems as, prior to the Vaccine Act’s preemption of these claims,
vaccine-injured children would sometimes sue doctors, alleging that that the
vaccine at issue was contraindicated or improperly administered.162
Next, health courts and the VICP both embody a similar ideology
concerning the nature of, and proper response to, accidents.
Conceptualizing accidents as either the result of larger “system failures” (as
in the case of health courts) or altogether inevitable (as in the case of the
VICP), both systems view injuries as a poor fit for traditional liability
actions, which tend to emphasize the personal fault of the ostensible
tortfeasor.163 Operationalizing this perception, both systems jettison tort’s
161 The word “serious” reflects the fact that, in order to control cost and keep caseloads in
check, both health courts and the VICP use injury-severity thresholds to exclude those with small
losses. Health court compensation would likely be available only to those who miss four weeks of
work or incur $3000 (or perhaps $4000) in medical expenses. See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra
note 85, at 467. To be eligible for compensation within the VICP, the effects of petitioner’s injury
must last for more than six months, result in a hospital stay or surgery, or culminate in death. See
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i)-(iii).
162 See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976) (involving a lawsuit against
a physician for the improper administration of a vaccine). The Vaccine Act preempts such
lawsuits. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(3).
163 Compare Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of
Individual and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 600 (2008) (discussing
“system failures”), with S.A. Sturges, Comment, Vaccine-Related Injuries: Alternatives to the Tort
Compensation System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919, 934 & n.125 (1986) (reporting that events that
culminate in a vaccine-related injury have been labeled “dyspractice,” rather than “malpractice,”
which “pertains to an undesirable, yet unavoidable, result”).
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“fault” concept in favor of a less punitive finding—“avoidability” in health
courts, no-fault in the VICP.
Next, both reforms strive to be even-handed.164 Unlike the modern tort
reform movement, which, in its support of contingency fee caps and damage
limits, transparently benefits defendants and their insurers at injured
plaintiffs’ expense165—health courts and the VICP offer benefits, and
impose burdens, on those on both sides of the “v.” And, perhaps as a
consequence, both reforms have received broad and bipartisan support.166
Further, both health courts and the VICP are born of frustration with
the lack of predictability within the traditional tort system.167 And both seek
to reduce decisional disparities in the same way: by demanding the
publication of decisions, and by placing power, whenever possible, in the
hands of experts.168 On the former, to promote consistency, both systems
compel the publication of ALJ and special master decisions, facilitating the
creation of a databank of written decisions upon which future physicians,
litigants, and decisionmakers can draw.169 On the latter, both exemplify the
“expertise model” of decisionmaking.170 As such, they both call upon neutral
experts to assess claims’ scientific validity as soon as claims are filed (the
“expert panel” within health courts and DVIC review within the VICP).171
They both vest decisionmaking authority in dedicated, independent, expert
164 Compare Peters, supra note 13, at 253 (observing that health courts “demonstrate[] an
evenhandedness that is uncommon among tort reformers”), with BURKE, supra note 36, at 149-58
(discussing the VICP’s bipartisan lineage). To be sure, some question health courts’ commitment
to even-handedness. See generally Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5.
165 See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
13, 22 (1988) (referring to most modern tort reforms as “victim take-away programs”).
166 Compare sources cited supra notes 5-17 (describing widespread support for health courts),
with BURKE, supra note 36, at 149-58 (noting the VICP’s bipartisan lineage).
167 Compare Howard, supra note 15 (championing health courts because they would “deliver[]
fair and reliable decisions”), with infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (showing that support
for the VICP came, in part, from a desire to inject predictability into the system for compensation
for vaccine injury).
168 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 437 (2007) (noting that “reasoned written opinions should, all
else equal, enhance consistency”).
169 Compare Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 (proposing that “[t]he health
court’s written decision would be recorded in a keyword-searchable electronic database that could
be accessed by adjudicators in future cases”), with 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B) (2012) (compelling the publication of VICP decisions, except if disclosure would reveal a trade secret or would
“constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy”).
170 For discussion of the “expertise model,” see Robert L. Rabin, The Vaccine No-Fault Act:
An Overview, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 269, 271 (2011).
171 Compare Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 468 (describing the role of the
“expert panel” in proposed health courts), with sources cited supra note 149 (concerning review by
experts within the DVIC).
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adjudicators (ALJs and special masters, respectively). They both arm these
expert decisionmakers with powerful decision aids (ACEs and the Table),
which were, themselves, created by experts.172 And, when a claimant’s
eligibility for compensation turns on complex scientific issues, both reforms
empower decisionmakers to retain still other independent experts to guide
their judgments.173
Next, both reforms also arise out of impatience with the tort system’s
sometimes intolerable delays—and thus aim to expedite proceedings
considerably. In fact, both reforms promise to resolve all, or nearly all,
entitlement decisions within one year from the date of filing.174 Pursuing
that objective, both systems streamline the substantive determinations that
must be made, site the adjudication of claims within a specialized court (as
specialists are thought to resolve cases more quickly than generalists),175
impose injury-severity thresholds (to ensure tribunals do not become
clogged resolving the claims of those with only minor impairments),176 and
abridge and simplify procedures that must be followed.
Finally, both reforms seek to expand but also limit compensation,
believing more claimants should recover, but successful claimants should
recover less. To accomplish the former, both systems relax the fault
standard, conduct affirmative outreach to notify potential injury victims of
their possible entitlement to relief,177 and (again) streamline filing and

172 Notably, a leading ACE architect recognizes that the Table is “akin to ACEs.” Bovbjerg,
supra note 32, at 277.
173 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465 (noting that an ALJ’s determinations should be guided by “court-appointed medical experts”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 513
(1989) (recommending that VICP special masters “retain independent medical experts”). Like the
VICP, health courts would also, it appears, permit parties to retain and utilize their own experts.
See Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing on S. 1337
Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions Comm., 109th Cong. 40 (2006) [hereinafter 2006
Senate Hearing] (statement of Philip K. Howard, Founder and Chair, Common Good) (clarifying
that “parties could have their own experts as well”).
174 Compare supra note 95 (compiling claims by health court proponents), with supra note 154
and infra notes 245-50 (compiling claims by supporters of the VICP).
175 See BAUM, supra note 33, at 32-33 (“[J]udges who regularly handle a single class of cases
are expected to dispose of their work in less time than their counterparts on generalist courts who
see that class of cases less frequently.”).
176 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (describing health courts’ and the VICP’s
injury-severity thresholds).
177 As noted, health courts would compel hospitals to notify patients if the patient sustains a
compensable injury. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The Vaccine Act also contains an
outreach obligation, as it directs HHS to undertake “reasonable efforts to inform the public of the
availability of the Program” and simultaneously imposes an “ethical obligation” on all attorneys
who are consulted “with respect to a vaccine-related injury or death” to explain “that compensation may be available under the program.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10(b) to (c) (2012).
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adjudication procedures (which should, logically, entice more to enter the
claims system). To accomplish the latter, both systems abridge and
standardize damages. Specifically, both offer only partial compensation for
noneconomic loss (health courts utilize a sliding scale, the VICP imposes a
$250,000 cap). And, both permit the full recovery of economic loss only to
the extent those losses are not elsewhere compensated.178
B. A Few Differences
Still, for all their similarities, health courts and the VICP are not
identical. In fact, they differ in a number of respects, including: (1) In the
VICP, the HHS, represented by the DOJ, is the respondent, whereas in
health courts, the culpable party or parties remain on the hook; (2) the
VICP is a true no-fault scheme, whereas health courts continue to require
an assessment of whether the physician or hospital erred; (3) the VICP is a
non-exclusive remedy, whereas the health court system would completely
preempt the medical malpractice field; and (4) in the VICP, petitioner’s
counsel is paid from the Fund, regardless of whether or not the petitioner
prevails, whereas, in health courts, attorneys’ fees come from the petitioner
and are contingent on success. Below, I explore these differences in greater
detail, while forecasting their probable effects.
1. The Respondent: Government Versus Physician or Hospital
First, unlike health courts, the VICP is a true alternative compensation
mechanism. It is funded by a seventy-five-cent per dose surcharge on each
vaccine dose administered, and the respondent in VICP adjudications is the
Secretary of HHS, represented by staff attorneys in the Torts Branch of the
DOJ. The potentially culpable party (the erring physician or maker of the
errant vaccine) is not present, is not represented, and is not in any way
affected if a decision is made to compensate the petitioner.
By contrast, in health courts, the potentially responsible party or parties
will be present, represented, and financially responsible. If the physician or
hospital is found to be liable (albeit under the relaxed avoidability
standard), the physician or hospital will have to pay the claimant and,
depending on whether reporting obligations to the National Petitioner Data
Bank (NPDB) are or are not modified, the physician might need to report

178

For more on damage calculations, see infra Section IV.C.

1672

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1631

the payment to the NPDB and, subsequently, disclose the fact of payment
to licensing authorities, affiliated hospitals, and insurance carriers.179
When forecasting the likely effect of this distinction, one might predict
that the active participation of the potentially culpable and financially
responsible party within the health court system would render those
proceedings more adversarial and combative, as compared to proceedings
within the VICP.180 The effect would be particularly stark if NPDB
reporting requirements remain in place or insurance premiums are
experience-rated, because if premiums are experience-rated (i.e., if they
fluctuate based on claims experience), claim payment would carry for
physicians or hospitals a clear financial penalty.181
2. Liability Standard: No-Fault Versus “Avoidability”
Second, the VICP is a true no-fault remedy, while health courts relax the
fault element without eliminating it. Even under the liberalized avoidability
standard, a health court claimant must still prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the care she received was suboptimal and that her doctor or
hospital neglected to utilize “best practices.”182 This won’t always be easy.
For example, health court proponents have said that “the avoidability
standard could result in liability in some situations in which hospitals could
have improved their systems at reasonable cost, but opted not to.”183 This
means that, to assign liability in at least these cases, the ALJ will have to
determine what constitutes or does not constitute “reasonable cost”—which,
in turn, means that health courts will, at least sometimes, confront precisely
the same vexing questions frequently confronted in the tort liability system.
Once again, the difference between health courts and the VICP is
significant. And, on balance, one might expect the difference to complicate

179 Currently, if a claim is paid on behalf of a physician (either by judgment or settlement),
the payment must be reported to the NPDB. Then, the fact of payment dogs the physician going
forward, resurfacing whenever she fills out forms from state licensing boards or seeks to renew her
liability insurance, managed care contracts, or hospital privileges. Peters, supra note 13, at 256. It is
not clear whether health court payments would trigger the same reporting obligation, though
health court proponents have cautioned against it. See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85,
at 484-87.
180 Cf. Danzon, supra note 21, at 460 (stating that “the key to low litigation expense [in the
Swedish patient compensation insurance system] is that individual providers have no personal
stake in the outcome”).
181 Health court proponents advocate rating hospitals’ or care units’ premiums to their claims
experience. See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 475.
182 Id. at 461.
183 Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 496.

2015]

A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts

1673

proceedings within health courts relative to the VICP, perhaps
dramatically.184
3. Remedy: Non-Exclusive Versus Exclusive
Third, the Vaccine Act contains a tort opt-out provision: Though all
seeking compensation for vaccine-related injury must initially file in the
VICP, unsatisfied petitioners can reject the special master’s judgment and
file a traditional (albeit restricted) tort claim against the vaccine
manufacturer or healthcare provider in state or federal court. Health courts,
by contrast, would offer an exclusive remedy: Though a health court
claimant might ultimately appeal an ALJ’s denial to a judicial court, there is
no de novo exit from the health court system.
Highlighting the availability of the VICP’s opt-out option and its
concomitant unavailability within health courts, some have argued that the
former “is not an apt analogy” for the latter “for the simple reason” that
dissatisfied VICP petitioners “may pursue a civil action for damages.”185
This characterization, however, exaggerates the practical importance of the
VICP’s civil action possibility. As noted above, the petitioner’s ability to file
a civil suit for vaccine injury is circumscribed by law—and, perhaps more
importantly, it is rarely exercised in practice. Even before the Supreme
Court’s recent (and further limiting) Bruesewitz decision, fewer than 0.5% of
vaccine claimants who received an award within the VICP rejected their
award in favor of a civil action.186 Furthermore, also prior to Bruesewitz,
“virtually all” unsuccessful VICP claimants acquiesced to the rejection,
rather than initiating lawsuits in state or federal court.187 No matter its onpaper possibilities, in other words, the VICP typically functions as an
exclusive remedy—minimizing the practical effect of this formal distinction.

184 MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 32, at 31 (recognizing that, as compared to an avoidability standard, a no-fault standard is “easier to administer”).
185 Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5, at 78.
186 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28, Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152) (“Department of Justice records indicate that
99.8% of successful Compensation Program claimants have accepted their awards, foregoing any
tort remedies against vaccine manufacturers.”).
187 STANLEY A. PLOTKIN ET AL., VACCINES 1673 (5th ed. 2008); see Katherine M. Cook &
Geoffrey Evans, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 127 PEDIATRICS S74, S76
(2011) (“The program is aware of only a small number of VICP claims that go on to the civil (tort)
system.”).
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4. Attorneys’ Fees: Fund Versus Petitioner
Fourth and finally, both systems are similar in that both restrict fees to
claimants’ counsel and also calculate those fees using the lodestar method
(hours worked times a reasonable hourly rate).188 The systems differ,
however, when it comes to claimants’ attorneys’ fees’ source and certainty.
The VICP pays from the Fund, and the sole prerequisite for payment is that
the petition was brought pursuant to “a reasonable basis” and “in good
faith.”189 By contrast, leading advocates suggest that in health courts a
claimant’s lawyer’s fee would come from the claimant’s recovery and would
be conditional upon her success.190
At first glance, it might appear that this difference is significant—that
health court counsel, paid only if successful, would have a much greater
incentive to screen clients prior to retention and zealously (maybe
overzealously) advocate on clients’ behalf. On the other hand, VICP
lawyers, paid hourly irrespective of victory, might be more likely to accept
dubious claims and, once retained, drag their heels, possibly prolonging
litigation even after the case appears doomed.191 Yet while these incentives
surely exist to some extent—and might well promote both the filing of nonmeritorious claims and protracted contestation in the VICP context, relative
to the health court context—differences between the systems should not be
overstated. In reality, VICP special masters award higher fees to counsel for
prevailing as compared to non-prevailing petitioners, partially bridging the
incentive gap between the two systems.192
IV. THE VICP IN ACTION: HEALTH COURTS ARE UNLIKELY TO
RESOLVE CLAIMS AS PREDICTABLY OR AS QUICKLY
AS PROPONENTS NOW SUGGEST
Health court proponents have pointed to the above design innovations—
pre-adjudication review, specialized ALJs, neutral experts, ACEs, the
avoidability standard, published decisions, and streamlined damage
188
189
190

See supra notes 109 (for health courts), 156 (for the VICP) and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (2012).
See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 463 (“Claimants would pay their attorneys on a contingent basis (i.e., only if the claim resulted in a compensation payment) . . . .”).
191 See generally Brandon L. Boxler, Fixing the Vaccine Act’s Structural Moral Hazard, 12 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2012).
192 One study showed a mean of $22,052 to successful counsel, compared to $14,053 to unsuccessful counsel. See Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 74 (1999). In addition, it should
be noted that this “difference” is entirely a product of the health court model, as it currently exists.
There is no inherent impediment to treating attorneys’ fees identically in both regimes.
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determinations—and have asserted that these innovations will ensure that
health courts will expedite adjudications (resolving nearly all claims within
one year of the date of filing), quell the adversarialism of dispute resolution,
and provide consistent, rational rulings that would “restore faith in the
reliability of medical justice.”193 Indeed, as noted at the outset, achieving
these administrative gains is central to health courts’ appeal—and, upon
adoption, health courts’ ability to withstand inevitable constitutional
attack.194 The $64,000 question, though, is whether health courts’ procedural
innovations will usher in those salutary consequences. How confident, in
other words, can we be of the above predictions?
The VICP offers a near-ideal laboratory to consider that question. As
seen above, the VICP shares most of the design innovations health court
proponents now enthusiastically tout. Furthermore, echoing current
predictions of health court processes, back when the VICP was created,
Congress expressed confidence that the Program would resolve claims
“quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity,”195 while contemporary
commentators predicted that the VICP would “offer prompt justice”196 to
vaccine-injured children while “guarantee[ing]” equal compensation to
“similarly situated individuals.”197
So, what do we learn when we assess health court advocates’ claims
through the prism of VICP experience? The picture is bleak. The VICP has
simply failed to offer compensation as consistently, as quickly, as easily, or as
simply as its proponents had predicted. Indeed, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has studied the Program and concluded:
“While [the Program] was expected to provide compensation for vaccinerelated injuries quickly and easily, these expectations have often not been
met.”198 A leader in the parents’ lobby, instrumental in the Act’s passage, has
concluded that the VICP’s administration has constituted “a betrayal of the
promise that was made to parents about how the compensation program

193
194
195
196

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3 (1986).
Editorial, A Way Out of the Vaccine Morass, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1986, at A34; see also, e.g.,
Barbara J. Connolly, Note, The Necessary Complement to Mandatory Immunizations: A National
Vaccination Compensation Program, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 155 (1986) (“A no-fault, nonadversarial national program will assure expedited, just compensation, at low transaction costs for those
who have sustained vaccine-related injuries.”); Neraas, supra note 54, at 164 (“The
Act . . . guarantees prompt compensation.”); id. at 165 (“In no case should a petitioner have to wait
more than a year to receive compensation.”).
197 Neraas, supra note 54, at 163.
198 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 19.
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would be implemented.”199 And, the man who served for over two decades
as the VICP’s chief special master has publicly lamented: “[L]itigating
causation cases has proven the antithesis of Congress’s desire for the
Program.”200 Below, I dissect the above contentions and identify what
concrete lessons the VICP offers for health courts going forward.
A. Predictability Remains Elusive
Predictability has long been touted as a prime advantage of judicial
specialization.201 And increasing the reliability and accuracy of medical
liability judgments is inarguably key to health courts’ appeal.202 So, too, in
the VICP. As the Vaccine Act was debated, predictability was prominent.
Vaccine Act proponents criticized the tort system for its unpredictability.203
They attributed the tort system’s unpredictability to its reliance on “lay
judgments.”204 And, they expressed faith that the VICP’s predictabilitypromoting innovations—most prominently, a small set of specialized,
experienced adjudicators and the Vaccine Injury Table (which mirrors
ACEs, in many respects)—would “eliminate[] the tremendous discrepancies
of injury awards under the tort recovery system.”205
199 Barbara Loe Fisher, Vaccine Injury Compensation: A Failed Experiment in Tort Reform?,
VACCINE AWAKENING (Nov. 20, 2008, 7:37 AM), http://vaccineawakening.blogspot.com/2008/11/
vaccine-injury-compensation-failed.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7BEC-YCUX; see also
Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Schwartz, former President, Dissatisfied Parents Together
(Aug. 25, 2014) (“Q: If you had to do it over again, would you support the VICP? A: If I knew
then everything I know now, I would not support the enactment of the VICP compensation
system. . . . It does not provide simple justice for children as we had hoped and been told that it
would.”).
200 Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 WL 387418, at
*7 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001). For the fact that the author of the Stevens decision, Gary Golkiewicz,
served as chief special master for more than two decades, see Advisory Comm’n on Childhood
Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of June 10, 2010, at 3, available
at http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/accvtranscript61010.pdf. Still, the system has its
defenders. See, e.g., James R. Copland, Administrative Compensation for Pharmaceutical- and VaccineRelated Injuries, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 277, 285 (2011) (“In general, the VICP must be judged as
an unqualified success.”).
201 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 15, 92 and accompanying text.
203 See, e.g., 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 137, at 277 (statement of John E. Lyons, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Division of Merck & Co., Inc.) (“The existing tort system poses a
number of problems, the most significant of which is its unpredictability.”); 1984 House Hearings,
supra note 120, at 237 (statement of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Labs. Division,
American Cyanamid Co.) (identifying “unpredictability” as “the fundamental problem facing the
U.S. industry in these cases”).
204 1984 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 235 (statement of Robert B. Johnson).
205 Neraas, supra note 54, at 164; see also BURKE, supra note 36, at 168-169 (observing that the
tort system’s “uncertainty” was “a consistent theme in the vaccine litigation debate” and that the
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1. The VICP Experience
Yet in reality, in the vaccine injury context, those innovations have fallen
far short of expectations. A working group convened by HHS’s Division of
Vaccine Injury Compensation has acknowledged that “[t]he decisions of the
Court are inconsistent.”206 The Program’s long-serving chief special master
has criticized the program for “inconsistent decision-making . . . even for
similarly situated litigants.”207 And lawyers have also observed that VICP
special masters sometimes decide cases differently. In an interview, I asked
one prominent lawyer to identify the biggest challenge an attorney
encounters while representing petitioners within the VICP. The lawyer
replied: “The lack of consistency between special masters: When we file a
case, we know that if we receive a particular special master, we’re not going
to win on the causation issue.”208 When the Federal Judicial Center
conducted a survey of petitioners’ counsel, it found much the same. For
example, one lawyer complained that “outcome often depends on
assignment,” while another lamented that “the biggest factor in winning or
losing a case in this program is which special master is assigned your
case.”209
The one empirical study on the matter lends support to these anecdotal
reports. In 1999, a researcher studied all published VICP opinions, yielding
a dataset of 786 claims. He found significant variability when it came to the
special masters themselves. Among those who had decided more than fifty
claims, petitioners’ success rate ranged from a low of 32.8% to a high of
65.8%.210 This is surprising, since cases are usually randomly assigned.211

VICP’s promise to deliver “much more reliable compensation” was critical to the Vaccine Act’s
passage).
206 DVIC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 148, app. H at 25.
207 Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 WL 387418, at
*11 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001); see also Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of Mar. 5, 2003, at 76 [hereinafter March 5, 2003 ACCV
Transcript] (on file with author) (“Though we see many of the same cases day after day, same
vaccines, same injury, same literature, extensive litigation continues and different results occur.”
(quoting Gary Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master, VICP)); id. at 73 (observing that “cases that look
very similar are decided very differently” (quoting Gary Golkiewicz)); U.S. Court of Fed. Claims,
Transcript of the 17th Judicial Conference, Nov. 9, 2004, at 62 (observing that, if two petitioners
have “different attorneys and different experts” the petitioners “can get very different results”
(quoting Richard B. Abell, Special Master, VICP)); id. (“[W]e’re looking for consistency, and, of
course, quite clearly, that isn’t always there.” (quoting Richard B. Abell)).
208 Telephone Interview with Attorney for VICP Petitioners (Oct. 1, 2014).
209 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 38.
210 See Ridgway, supra note 192, at 66.
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There was also variability based on attorney representation; of the attorneys
who had represented more than twenty claimants, claimants’ success rates
ranged from 37.9% to 72%.212 All told, after crunching the numbers, the
study concluded that, despite the VICP’s many predictability-promoting
innovations, “idiosyncratic differences among judges and litigators”
continue to “influenc[e] the outcome of cases.”213
2. Prospects for Health Courts?
Will health courts—which have staked much of their success on their
ability to “eliminate,” or at least substantially reduce, decisional
discrepancies—also disappoint when it comes to rationalizing compensation
decisions? The answer, it seems, is almost certainly yes.
a. Health Courts Face Additional Impediments
The first reason health courts seem poised to disappoint is that theory
concerning judicial specialization and decisionmaking suggests that the
VICP ought to outperform health courts when it comes to reducing
decisional disparities. Part of the reason is structural. According to
Professor Stephen Legomsky, a leading expert on judicial specialization: All
else equal, the fewer adjudicators there are in a given area, the more
consistent their decisions, as “[i]t is easier to monitor and conform to the
decisions of one’s colleagues when they are few in number than it is when
they are many.”214 Applying that principle, the VICP consists of only eight
special masters (one chief and seven associates), who toil in close quarters,
over extended periods.215 By contrast, owing to case volumes, health courts
would necessarily require many more—and many more far-flung—
decisionmakers, disadvantaging it along this dimension.

211 Most claims are randomly assigned, though it is possible for claims to be directed to a
particular special master if he or she has particularly relevant expertise. See 2014 GAO REPORT,
supra note 52, at 6 n.20.
212 See Ridgway, supra note 192, at 66. This statistic ought to be viewed with caution, as it
could say more about case inputs than case outputs. Some counsel, that is, might be better at
identifying clients with stronger claims. Or, some counsel might specialize in off-Table claims,
which (as noted below) face longer odds.
213 Id. at 68. Even so, of course, it is possible that the VICP represents an improvement over
the traditional tort system. Making that apples-to-apples comparison is impossible with available
evidence. See BAUM, supra note 33, at 218 (discussing relevant challenges).
214 Legomsky, supra note 168, at 429.
215 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1) (2012).
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Second, Legomsky suggests that consistency suffers as cases become
more plentiful in number and complex in substance.216 This, too, cuts in
favor of the VICP, as compared to health courts, VICP review is quite
circumscribed. VICP special masters handle relatively few petitions (only
about 500 VICP petitions are filed per year).217 They only adjudicate certain
kinds of petitions—namely, petitions alleging serious injury following
inoculation from one of about two-dozen covered vaccines. And, since the
VICP is a true no-fault remedy, special masters only ask one question when
making entitlement decisions: Was the petitioner’s injury caused, morelikely-than-not, by a covered vaccine? Health courts, by contrast, are apt to
adjudicate more claims and wrestle with a far wider array of injuries—
considering everything from prescription-drug side effects, to hospital
infections, to birth injuries, to drug overdoses, to diagnostic mistakes, to
surgical mishaps, to physicians’ failure to obtain informed consent.
Additionally, because the quality of care remains an issue, health court ALJs
must determine, not just whether the physician caused the claimant’s injury,
but also whether the injury was avoidable, which (as noted above) seems
destined to complicate the relevant analysis.
Finally, the structure of appellate review also favors the VICP. In
general, Legomsky explains, appellate review enhances consistency if review
is lodged within a single, centralized tribunal.218 Lodging appellate review
within myriad generalist tribunals, he cautions, tends to have the opposite
effect.219 The VICP takes the former tack—consolidating appeals in
specialized courts: the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, then the Federal
Circuit. Health courts, by contrast, take the latter (disfavored) approach—
offering one layer of specialized review (to a higher-level administrative
tribunal), but relegating to generalist courts all subsequent appeals.220
b. Some Other Specialized Tribunals Have Failed to Achieve Consistency
A second problem for health court proponents is that, in failing to
eliminate decisional disparities, the VICP is not alone. In other (diverse)
216 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 432 (concerning case number effects); id. at 441-42 (concerning complexity).
217 See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 31 (revealing that 386 claims were filed
in fiscal year 2011, 401 claims were filed in fiscal year 2012, 503 claims were filed in 2013, and 633
claims were filed in 2014).
218 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 436-37; cf. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 339 (1991) (“[A]llocations of subject matter should avoid
combining generalists and specialists in ways that erode gains from specialization.”).
219 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 436-37.
220 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465.
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areas of law, specialized adjudicators have labored to create consistency—
strongly suggesting that specialization is no predictability-promoting
panacea.221 For example, immigration courts are specialized; they are all part
of a single national Executive Office for Immigration Review, and
immigration judges, who devote themselves to immigration adjudications,
must all meet the same qualifications.222 But asylum decisions are
inconsistent. Indeed, a groundbreaking 2007 study examined 140,000
decisions rendered by immigration judges over a four-and-a-half-year
period and found stunning disparities. These disparities existed between
courts: For instance, Chinese nationals seeking asylum in the United States
had a 7% chance of success in Atlanta, but a whopping 76% chance of success
in Orlando.223 Disparities also existed between judges on the same court: In
New York, for example, one judge granted asylum in only 6% of the relevant
cases before him, while another’s grant rate was 91%, even though petitions
were randomly assigned.224
Decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offer another
exemplar. By law, veterans are entitled to compensation for disabling
conditions incurred or aggravated during military service. To award and
calculate payment, trained specialists within the VA (called Rating Veterans
Service Representatives) evaluate claims, determine eligibility, and, if the
veteran’s disability is service related, assign a disability percentage rating.225
Once again, however, though they are made by specialists, judgments are
221 Others would add that the experience of the Federal Circuit also “cautions against assuming that concentration of cases in a single court will produce a high level of uniformity in the law.”
Baum, supra note 34, at 1557. The Federal Circuit was created, in large part, to promote consistency in patent law. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2-7 (1981) (noting that the creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would “improve the administration of the patent
law by centralizing appeals in patent cases”). In action, however, many suggest the Federal Circuit
has labored on this score. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1802 (2013) (“It is not clear whether the Federal Circuit has brought
uniformity, quality, or efficiency to patent law.”).
222 See Baum, supra note 34, at 1546-47 (reporting that immigration judges are highly specialized and extremely knowledgeable); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 380 n.146 (2007) (outlining relevant qualifications of
immigration judges).
223 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 222, at 329-30. The authors acknowledge that the
disparity may be partially explained by unidentified differences within certain cities’ migrant
populations. But they also note that any hypothesized difference in migrant populations “could
not possibly explain the differences in grant rates from officer to officer within regional asylum
offices.” Id. at 321-22.
224 See id. at 334.
225 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-89, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS: TIMELY PROCESSING REMAINS A DAUNTING CHALLENGE 4 (2012) (outlining the
process of veterans’ disability compensation claims).
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not consistent. To the contrary, the Veterans’ Disability Benefits
Commission reports that the program has “long struggled with timeliness,
accuracy, and consistency,”226 while the GAO reports that “nearly one-third
of decisions are incorrect or have technical or procedural errors.”227
The Social Security Disability System, which provides monetary
benefits to persons with disabilities, offers another case in point. Within the
system, disability decisions are initially made by state agencies, using
federal guidelines. Then, if benefits are denied, claimants may request a
hearing before an ALJ.228 These ALJs are specialized; they do nothing but
adjudicate social security disability determinations. But their decisions, too,
are marred by glaring inconsistencies. In fact, one recent study found that,
nationally, ALJs’ “allowance rates” (determinations that were at least partly
favorable to the claimant) ranged from a meager 4% to a whopping 98%,229
while stark variations existed between ALJs within the same office. In Atlanta,
for example, one ALJ’s allowance rate was 19%, while a colleague’s rate was
89%, even though claims were randomly assigned.230
Perhaps most dishearteningly, theorists suggest that these adjudicatory
inconsistencies are, to some degree, inescapable. Returning, again, to
Professor Legomsky:

226 VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY: VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 327 (2007); see also U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-146, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FACING DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESSING 5 (2000)

[hereinafter Bascetta Testimony] (statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta, Associate Director, Veterans
Benefits Admin.) (discussing a “perception of inconsistency in decisions made by different
regional offices”). This “perception” has been difficult to test empirically, as the VA has repeatedly
failed to conduct planned reviews. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, NO. 08-02073-96, AUDIT OF VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION COMPENSATION RATING ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY REVIEWS, at i (2009).
227 Bascetta Testimony, supra note 226, at 1.
228 See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2013-1, IMPROVING CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS 2 (2013) (discussing the Social Security disability claims adjudication process).
229 HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT ON
ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 13-14 (2013). Some variation may be attributable
to regional variations in the claimant population (i.e., certain injuries are particularly common in
certain regions of the country). See Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Inconsistency and Angst in
District Court Resolution of Social Security Disability Appeals 12 (Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Research
Paper No. 2014-30, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530158
(making this observation).
230 See Krent & Morris, supra note 229, at 13; id. at 19 (concluding “the percentage of disability claims awarded by ALJs differ markedly from region to region and from ALJ to ALJ”).
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As long as adjudicators are flesh-and-blood human beings, as long as the
subject matter is ideologically and emotionally volatile, and as long as limits
to the human imagination constrain the capacity of legislatures to prescribe
the specific results for every conceivable fact situation, there will be large
disparities in adjudicative outcomes . . . .231

Particularly worrisome for health courts, leading theorists have suggested
that inconsistency may be particularly inescapable when the area is highly
charged (as medical malpractice is)232 and when cases hinge on witness
credibility (as medical malpractices cases often do).233
c. Some Inconsistency Is Inevitable in Medical Evaluation
When it comes to certain health court proponents’ pledge to “eliminate”
decisional disparities, the third obstacle is that eliminating disparities in
medical valuation is, by all accounts, impossible. When passing judgment on
physician conduct, even trained and independent experts, it turns out, have
difficulty determining whether physicians erred and whether a given
physician’s error precipitated or aggravated a given patient’s injury. Or, to
quote a 2001 study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association: “In all general medical and surgical chart review studies to date,
reviewers have had a difficult time agreeing on whether an error caused an
adverse event or even on whether something was an error at all.”234 One
recent study, for example, found that when independent reviewers (insurerretained physicians) evaluated closed medical malpractice insurer claims
files, they disagreed with one another “in 34.3% of the cases.”235 Another
231 Legomsky, supra note 168, at 415-16. Gary Golkiewicz, the VICP’s long-serving chief
special master, has said much the same: “Wherever there is human involvement, you will have
variance in outcome.” March 5, 2003 ACCV Transcript, supra note 207, at 81.
232 See Legomsky, supra note 168, at 442 (cautioning that “subjects that inspire ideological or
emotional fervor would seem to have the greatest potential for disparate outcomes”); cf. W. John
Thomas, The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: A Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 459, 460 (1992) (“Medical malpractice is perhaps the most controversial tort in the American
legal system.”).
233 See Baum, supra note 34, at 1543 (suggesting that specialization confers no benefit when it
comes to assessing witness credibility); cf. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS,
AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 175 (1995) (“[Q]uestions bearing on credibility of
witnesses—different versions of events between patient and doctor or between medical personnel—pervade many malpractice disputes.”).
234 Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical
Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 415, 419 (2001) (footnotes
omitted).
235 Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 884 (2002); see also, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al.,
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recent study discerned little agreement among experts as to whether a
patient’s death was preventable: “If one reviewer rated a death as definitely
or probably preventable,” the researchers found, “the probability that the
next reviewer would rate that case as definitely not preventable (18%) was
actually slightly higher than the probability that the second reviewer would
agree with the first (16%).”236
d. A Sober Look at the Status Quo
Finally, it is wise to recall the admonition of David P. Currie and Frank
I. Goodman in their classic article on judicial specialization. “[B]efore
drastic alterations are made in the present jurisdictional system in the name
of removing disuniformity,” they advise, “a serious effort should be made to
determine the extent of the problem.”237 Such an effort, it turns out, reveals
that the current medical malpractice system is not the whimsical lottery that
some health court proponents accuse it of being.
While some health court champions declare, for example, that
“[m]alpractice law has become so muddled that going to court is like rolling
the dice,”238 or, worse, that the malpractice system “resembles Russian
Roulette,”239 decades of research indicates, to the contrary, that the current
system does a fairly good, though not perfect, job sorting between
meritorious and non-meritorious claims. A 2006 study by David Studdert
and co-authors found, for example, that “[c]laims without merit were
generally resolved appropriately: only one in four resulted in payment.”240
Other evidence likewise shows that jury verdicts and medical malpractice
Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of Physician Agreement in a Retrospective
Chart Review, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 460 (1996) (finding relatively frequent “extreme
disagreement on the occurrence of an adverse event”); Karen L. Posner et al., Variation in Expert
Opinion in Medical Malpractice Review, 85 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1049, 1051 (1996) (finding that when
participating anesthesiologists reviewed claimants’ original medical records, they disagreed about
the appropriateness of care—whether the care was “reasonable and prudent by the standards of
anesthetic care at the time of the event”—38% of the time).
236 Hayward & Hofer, supra note 234, at 417.
237 Currie & Goodman, supra note 33, at 66.
238 UDELL & KENDALL, supra note 11, at 1.
239 2006 Senate Hearing, supra note 173, at 44 (statement of Philip K. Howard); see also U.S.
SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., supra note 14, at 2 (“The current system for compensating
injured patients operates somewhat like a lottery; jury verdicts are characterized more by their
random nature than by good medicine.”); Jeffrey D. Pariser, Specialized Health Care Courts: Could
They Create Clear Standards and Greater Reliability?, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, Aug.
2004, at 3 (“Medical justice today, studies show, is worse than random.”). For criticism of tort
reformers’ persistent use of the lottery metaphor, see Timothy D. Lytton et al., Tort as a Litigation
Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 267 (2011).
240 Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2029.
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settlement decisions generally comport with expert determinations.241 So
the question is not whether health courts will rationalize a hopelessly
irrational system. The question is whether health courts will substantially
improve an already fairly rational system. That is a much tougher task. And
when assessing whether it is doable, it is worrying that (1) the VICP, which
is, theory would suggest, better positioned to reduce decisional disparities,
has seemingly struggled on this score; (2) in other contexts, specialized
tribunals have failed to create consistency; and (3) even experts sometimes
disagree about preventability and causality questions, in the course of
medical record review.
B. “Challenged to Settle Claims Quickly”242
Next, specialized courts have long been championed for expediting
compensation decisions.243 And, as noted above, speeding payments is
touted as one of health court’s principal advantages.244 Speed was also
central to the VICP plan. In the run-up to the Vaccine Act’s enactment,
many of the Act’s backers emphasized the need to expedite adjudications.
For example, the main parents’ group supporting the legislation
(Dissatisfied Parents Together) implored congressional leaders: “There
needs to be an up or down decision within a reasonable time . . . . The
compensation process must not drag on for years while the children are left
uncared for.”245 Representatives from vaccine manufacturers emphasized
that the Act’s “most important” objective was to “ensure that injured
children and their parents are fairly compensated, with a minimum of
delay.”246 And the President-Elect of the American Academy of Pediatrics

241 See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2007) (sifting
through three decades of empirical research on jury decisionmaking in the medical malpractice
context and concluding that jury decisions generally comport with expert determinations);
Mehlman & Nance, supra note 5 (analyzing empirical evidence that undermines claims that the
medical malpractice system resembles a lottery). The above evidence is at odds with a frequently
cited finding of the Harvard Medical Practice Study. However, as many have discussed, that
study was not designed to assess adjudication accuracy. See generally, e.g., Tom Baker, Reconsidering
the Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501 (2005).
242 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52.
243 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
244 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
245 1987 House Hearing, supra note 119, at 80 (statement of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, President,
Dissatisfied Parents Together).
246 Id. at 93 (statement of Douglas MacMaster, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme Division,
Merck & Co., Inc.).
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joined the chorus, calling “a prompt settlement of claims . . . fundamental to
any improved system.”247
Establishing a statutory 240-day deadline for all VICP adjudication
decisions, Congress appeared to take these pleas seriously.248 Indeed,
explaining this deadline, the House Report accompanying the Vaccine Act
provided that, whereas “[l]awsuits and settlement negotiations” under the
traditional tort system took “months and even years to complete,” “[t]he
entire [VICP] proceeding . . . is to take place as expeditiously as
possible.”249 Expediting compensation, Congress continued, was vital,
because “much of the equity in limiting compensation and limiting other
remedies arises from the speed and reliability with which the petitioner can
expect judgment; without such quick and certain conclusion of proceedings,
the compensation system would work an injustice upon the petitioner.”250
1. The VICP Experience
So, how has the VICP fared when it comes to the expeditious resolution
of petitions? Not well. Indeed, despite Congress’s high hope and clear
demand, the VICP in action is notable not for its speed but rather for its
long times to decision. Few petitions (less than 5%) satisfy the statutory
240-day deadline.251 Most exceed it by a wide margin. Of petitions filed
prior to 1999, only 14% were decided within one year, 19% took between one
and two years, 39% took between two and five years, and 18% dragged on for
five years or more.252 From there, things got worse. Of petitions filed
between 1999 and March 31, 2014, the Program’s average adjudication time
clocked in at about five-and-a-half years, while most petitions (51%)
remained pending for over a half-decade.253
247
248

1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 137, at 148 (statement of Martin H. Smith).
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6601, 103 Stat.
2106, 2288 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012)).
249 H.R. REP. NO. 99-108, at 6, 17 (1986).
250 Id. at 17; see also WENDY K. MARINER, INNOVATION AND CHALLENGE: THE FIRST
YEAR OF THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 9-10 (1991) (“[A]
prompt award was the major justification for limiting the compensation payable to recipients.”).
251 See Mitch Weiss et al., AP IMPACT: “Vaccine Court” Keeps Claimants Waiting, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 17, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/637dbaa7b993454981320907b0972cf6/
ap-impact-vaccine-court-keeps-claimants-waiting (concluding, as of January 2013, that just 4.5% of
petitions were resolved within Congress’s 240-day framework).
252 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 8 fig.1.
253 The fact that most petitions remained pending for over five years logically means that the
VICP’s median time to resolution also exceeded five years during the period. See 2014 GAO
REPORT, supra note 52, at 10 fig.1 (showing that 51% of VICP claims filed between 1999 and
March 31, 2014 required more than five years to resolve); id. at 9 (reporting that the roughly 8800
claims filed as of 1999 and resolved as of March 31, 2014 took an average of about 5.5 years to
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Critically, it takes more time, on average, to process claims within the
Program than it does to process claims, through judgment, within the
traditional tort system: approximately 66 months within the VICP, as
compared to 25.6 months for tort cases that terminate in a judgment or
verdict.254 VICP proceedings take longer than consumer class actions

adjudicate). For successful petitioners, reported adjudication times (both the mean and median)
include the time to calculate the compensation amount. See id. at 13.
More recently, since 2009, the average time to adjudication has dropped to about 1.6 years—a
positive development that is presumably traceable to a rise in negotiated settlements and a
reduction in the proportion of petitions involving a catastrophic injury. Id. at 9-13. (These days, a
high proportion of petitions involve relatively minor injuries to adults, caused by the flu vaccine.
See infra note 292.) Even so, drawing definite conclusions about acceleration would be premature;
some post-2009 claims are still pending and gains may erode once those pending claims are
resolved and factored in. See 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 10-12; see also Telephone
Interview with Curtis Webb, Attorney for VICP Petitioners and former Chair, Advisory Comm.
on Childhood Vaccines (Oct. 27, 2014) (“The statistics suggest that cases are being resolved more
quickly, but that is because the cases that are in the Program today are less likely to involve
seriously injured children.”).
When discussing time to adjudication, a final point to recognize is that many delays are
caused by petitioners—as petitioners sometimes take time to compile medical records, submit
expert reports, and finalize life-care plans. See Advisory Comm’n of Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of June 1, 2005, at 21 [hereinafter June 1, 2005
ACCV Transcript] (on file with author) (“[I]t’s problematic to measure the effectiveness of a
program by how long it takes to process a petition when the . . . petitioner[] is the one requesting
the delay, and that happens with significant frequency.” (quoting Mark Rogers, Torts Branch,
Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)). Still, even if petitioners are the ones “requesting the delay,” it
would be wrong to lay all the blame at petitioners’ feet, for petitioners’ need to take time to
assemble detailed documentation is logically influenced by others’ demand for detailed documentation. The GAO observed this interaction while compiling its 1999 report:
Another factor significantly increasing processing times is that as the program received additional funding for staff and experts to defend claims, the government increasingly challenged claims in which the cause of injury was in doubt. As a result, petitioners needed
more information and time to prepare cases, which resulted in processing times that were
much longer than envisioned when the program began.
1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 3. Furthermore, the GAO found that, even after all the
information was submitted, “in most cases, it took the court over another year to reach its
decision.” Id. at 11.
254 See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202803, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES,
2001, at 8 (2004); see also THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 228129, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 9 (2009)
(reporting that, in 2005, the median tort case processing time, from the filing of the complaint to
verdict or judgment was 22.3 months). Curiously, some writing about the VICP seem unconcerned about the VICP’s adjudication times, while substantially overestimating the delays within
the traditional tort system. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 143, at S134 (“Adjudication times for VICP
cases are much shorter than those for the civil system, averaging 3.0 years for vaccines administered after 1988.”).
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(which take roughly 32 months).255 And, VICP petitions appear to take
substantially more time to resolve than medical malpractice claims, which,
in terms of injury severity and scientific complexity, probably offer the
closest comparator.256
For some cases, the path through the system can be downright
byzantine. One such case is Kolakowski v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services.257 Born “vigorous and alert” on December 17, 1998, Thomas
Kolakowski was given a Hepatitis B vaccine on January 20, 1999.258 He died
five days later.259 Believing there to be a link between the vaccine and what
was listed on Thomas’s death certificate as a “sudden unexplained death,”
Thomas’s parents filed a VICP petition on August 4, 1999.260 The petition
was not finally decided until November 23, 2010—when it was denied in a
130-page ruling.261 Baby Doe/90’s claim went no speedier. Administered a
DTP vaccine in 1995 that triggered a seizure disorder, Baby Doe/90 filed a
petition for compensation on October 26, 1998.262 Still, no entitlement
decision was made until June 18, 2009, and no award was finalized until
September 29, 2010—nearly twelve years after filing.263 Ilya Dobrydnev
encountered comparable difficulties. He filed a petition for injuries
allegedly caused by a Hepatitis B vaccine on October 25, 2004.264 After
255 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 820 tbl.2 (2010) (dividing 963 days by 30 to arrive at
32.1 months).
256 According to a recent study of closed medical malpractice claims, the average time from
filing with the insurer to closure either with or without payment was 20.3 months, while claims
involving pediatricians (arguably, the most analogous to VICP claims) averaged 24.1 months. See
Seabury et al., supra note 72, at 113, 116 fig.3. Or, for medical malpractice cases resolved by an
actual court verdict or judgment, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that the average
adjudication time is roughly 33.2 months. See COHEN & SMITH, supra note 254, at 8; see also
COHEN, supra note 254, at 9 tbl.8 (reporting that, in 2005, the median medical malpractice case
processing time, from filing to resolution by verdict or judgment, was 30 months); VIDMAR, supra
note 233, at 60 (reporting that, in a 1984–1987 sample of North Carolina medical malpractice
claims, an average of 26 months elapsed between the filing of a lawsuit and trial); Studdert et al.,
Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2025, 2027 tbl.1 (reporting that roughly
three years elapsed (mean and median) between the opening and closing of a medical malpractice
claim (with “claim” defined as a written demand for compensation)).
257 No. 99-0625V, 2010 WL 5672753 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 23, 2010).
258 Id. at *3, *97.
259 See id.
260 See id. at *1.
261 See id.
262 Doe/90 v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.[Redacted]V, 2010 WL
3943641, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29, 2010).
263 See id.
264 See Dobrydnev v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL
5631230, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 23, 2013).
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ping-ponging around the system for nearly a decade, his entitlement to
compensation was only recently rejected.265 Here, I do not suggest that
these cases are typical. They, fortunately, are not.266 Instead, my point is to
illustrate that, just as cases can get bogged down within the traditional tort
system, cases can, and sometimes do, get bogged down within the
supposedly “streamlined” process of the VICP.
2. Prospects for Health Courts?
The above shows that the VICP was sold to the public, in large measure,
as a way to expedite compensation for vaccine-injured claimants. But in
practice on this score, the VICP has failed to deliver. The relevant question
now becomes whether health courts—which ascribe many problems that
afflict the current medical malpractice environment to its slow time to
decision—are apt to suffer the same setbacks.
There is an argument that the above delays are unique to the VICP. The
best argument in favor of this VICP exceptionalism would be that the VICP
has twice been hit by an onslaught of unanticipated filings. First, early in its
lifecycle, the VICP anticipated receiving roughly 1000 “retrospective claims”
(i.e., claims for vaccine injuries sustained prior to the Act’s October 1988
effective date).267 Instead, 4500 such claims were filed.268 These filings
created a backlog, which for many years strained resources, thereby slowing
adjudications.269 Then, just as the VICP dug itself out from that mountain
of retrospective cases, the Program got hit a second time by a barrage of
petitions (over 5500 in all) alleging a link between vaccines and autism.270 If

265
266

See Dobrydnev v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 566 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Nor are they total outliers. See Weiss et al., supra note 251 (concluding, after conducting a
comprehensive study of VICP petitions and completing more than 100 interviews with relevant
stakeholders, that “[h]undreds [of petitions] have surpassed the decade mark”); Telephone
Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“Most cases that involve catastrophic injury, if they
are contested and successful, last between six or ten years, and cases with appeals can last even
longer.”).
267 See Louise Palmer, Government Can’t Meet Vaccine Injury Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1993, at 6 (quoting Thomas Balbier, VICP Director, as stating, “We thought there would be
maybe a thousand.”).
268 See id.
269 See June 1, 2005 ACCV Transcript, supra note 53, at 27 (“There are many reasons why
the program has been unable to meet [the 240-day deadline]. The first one came right at the
inception of the program, and those were the retrospective cases. The program was besieged with
thousands of them and it stressed the program and it took us 10 years to work through that
backlog.”).
270 The first autism spectrum disorder petition was filed in 1998. By 2003, 2437 petitions had
been filed; by 2011, 5636 petitions had been logged. See Laura A. Binski, Note, Balancing Policy
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health courts are not similarly overrun, one might argue, they might fulfill
their promise of resolving claims quickly.
Yet while that conclusion is surely possible, there are important reasons
why health court advocates should not write off the VICP experience. Most
notably, the VICP’s inundation problem fits squarely within the literature
concerning specialized courts. When identifying concerns about specialized
tribunals, that is, legal theorists have long argued that, precisely because
specialized tribunals aren’t diversified, they are susceptible to abrupt swings
in the size of their dockets. As Judge Richard Posner has explained: “It is a
mathematical law that the federal appellate caseload as a whole changes less
from year to year than the components of that caseload. So if each
component were assigned to a special court it would be harder to match
supply to demand.”271
Also worrying, other specialized tribunals exhibit this dynamic—
occasionally encountering long delays when caseloads shift. For example,
between 2009 and 2012, the average length of time to complete a claim for
disability benefits within the Veterans Administration (VA) ballooned from
161 days to 260 days, while the VA’s backlog of claims—defined as claims
awaiting a decision for over 125 days—more than tripled.272 Why?
According to the GAO, the chief culprit was that, in 2010, a court decision
forced the VA to re-adjudicate 260,000 claims initiated by Vietnam veterans
for injuries allegedly sustained by exposure to the defoliant Agent Orange.
These re-adjudications consumed 37% of the VA’s adjudicatory resources,
substantially impairing the systemwide pace of claims resolution.273 The
upshot of the above is that both theory and some evidence suggest that what
happened in the VICP was not isolated or anomalous. Caseload volatility is,
instead, an unfortunate but inevitable drawback of tribunal specialization.
Meanwhile, the VICP experience—initially underestimating the number
of claims that would be filed, becoming inundated by claims, and then
falling behind in adjudications—raises the related question of whether
health courts would be able to accurately predict caseloads (and create

Tensions of the Vaccine Act in Light of the Omnibus Autism Proceeding: Are Petitioners Getting a Fair
Shot at Compensation?, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 683, 701 (2011) (compiling these statistics).
271 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 259-60
(1996); accord Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 33, at 805 (“[W]hen the docket of a specialized court
is growing, it will not have an adequate number of judges, and getting new judges is difficult, time
consuming, and imprudent in light of the probability that the caseload will soon turn down
again.”).
272 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 225, at 1.
273 See id. at 6-7; see also id. at 12 (“37% of its claim processing resources nationally were devoted to adjudicating Agent Orange claims.”).
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adequate adjudicatory capacity) ex ante. On that question, it is relevant
that, in grossly underestimating initial claim filings, the VICP is not alone.
To the contrary, a number of federal compensation programs (including the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Program, the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program, and the Black Lung Program)
have done precisely the same thing—to precisely the same effect.274
Furthermore, matching adjudicatory capacity with claimant demand may be
particularly tough in the health court context. This is because “[a] primary
goal of health court proposals is to expand the pool of injured patients who
are eligible for compensation.”275 Currently, there are roughly 9000
successful medical malpractice claims lodged against physicians in the
United States each year,276 even while roughly 700,000 Americans sustain
preventable medical injuries annually.277 Just how many of those
preventably injured patients would seek health court compensation—and
thus, how much adjudicatory capacity health courts would need—would be
anyone’s guess.278

274 When the Radiation Exposure Compensation Program was enacted, the DOJ estimated
that 13,000 claims would be filed. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-628T,
FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: PERSPECTIVES ON FOUR PROGRAMS FOR INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY EXPOSURE TO HARMFUL SUBSTANCES 10 (2008) (statement of Anne-Marie
Lasowski, Acting Director, Educ., Workforce, & Income Sec. Issues, Gov’t Accountability
Office). In fact, 20,600 claims were eventually lodged. See id. Or, when the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program was created, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that 13,400 claims would be filed. See id. But in fact, 59,500 were filed. See id. Or, when
the Black Lung Program was established, the Department of Labor anticipated the receipt of
520,000 claims; instead 960,800 were filed. See id. According to the GAO, these miscalculations
“affected the length of time it took to finalize claims and compensate eligible claimants.” Id. at i.
275 Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465.
276 See Myungho Paik et al., The Receding Tide of Medical Practice Litigation: Part 1—National
Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612, 617 fig.1 (2013).
277 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (estimating that 700,000 patients are preventably
injured each year).
278 Of course, not all 700,000 would be eligible for compensation because of health courts’
injury-severity thresholds. A further concern is that, if health courts do become overwhelmed,
speed may not be the only casualty. In other contexts, delays accompanying inundation have
sometimes prompted policymakers to take controversial steps to expedite or streamline adjudications. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for
Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461, 499-501 (discussing how disposition “goals” imposed on ALJs
when the SSA was “faced with large caseload backlogs” created “an atmosphere at SSA in
which . . . ALJs felt pressure to process claims quickly and deny benefits whenever possible”).
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C. Calculating Individualized Compensation Is Time Consuming and
Challenging
The next concrete lesson that the VICP offers for health courts concerns
the difficulty of calculating individualized compensation. This insight is not
new. Robert Keeton, a pioneer of the no-fault movement, cautioned back in
1973 that “[i]f a nonfault system undertakes to individualize compensation,
it cannot escape the significant administrative cost of doing so.”279 The
VICP illustrates Keeton’s warning in vivid detail: It shows that, even when
an act’s architects bend over backwards to simplify damage calculations,
projecting future losses can still be challenging. This fact, once again, has
troubling implications for health courts, as well as certain other no-fault
mechanisms.
As noted above, the VICP goes to great lengths to simplify damage
determinations. Compensation in the event of a vaccine-related death is
automatically set at $250,000,280 while payment calculations for injuries are
also standardized. Injured claimants, that is, are entitled to (1) lost wages,
(2) compensation for pain and suffering, and (3) actual medical and
rehabilitation expenses. But, of those three damage categories, only the
third is consistently calculated on an individualized basis. Minors’ lost
wages are pegged to a national average,281 while damages for pain and
suffering are capped at $250,000.282 Further, even within the third category,
calculating past medical and rehabilitation expenses is typically easy and
uncontroversial, leaving only future medical or remedial care as the locus of
dispute.
1. The VICP Experience
Given these statutory shortcuts, soon after enactment, the VICP was
praised for “provid[ing] a straightforward means of measuring damages.”283
Yet while the VICP does formally take numerous steps to simplify damage
calculations, those efforts have, once again, fallen short of expectations. By
May 1991, a commentator had dryly observed that “determining the amount
of compensation payable to eligible petitioners has been more time279
280
281

Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 611 (1973).
See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (2012).
See id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(B). Adults are entitled to their “actual and anticipated loss of
earnings.” Id. § 300aa-15(a)(3)(A).
282 See id. § 300aa-15(a)(4).
283 Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation
Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 959 (1993); see also id. (noting that, at least on paper, the VICP
“assesses damages in a simple and administratively efficient manner”).
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consuming than might have been predicted.”284 That turned out to be an
understatement. In 2002, for example, a median of 533 days elapsed
between when a victim was found to be eligible for compensation and the
time when damages were actually awarded; in 2003, a median of 564 days
elapsed; in 2004, a median of 529 days elapsed; and in 2005, a median of 484
days elapsed.285 This means that it often takes the VICP twice as long to
calculate damages as Congress—which, recall, imposed a 240-day statutory
deadline on vaccine adjudications—thought it would take to resolve cases
from start-to-finish.
Worse, some damage disputes devolve into debates over minutiae. For
example, one former special master has complained, “It’s a game. I had
people arguing over the cost of the thing you put in the bottom of the
bathtub so people don’t slip.”286 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times reported in
2004:
Even when families do win compensation, officials have sometimes
battled them over just a few dollars.
In one case, government representatives argued that $150 a year was too
much to spend on wheelchair maintenance. They have haggled over how
much to allow for replacement shoes and braces for people with polio.
Another time, they recommended rubber sheets for the bed of an
incontinent person because they were cheaper, although less comfortable,
than disposables costing $135 a year.287

In other cases, disputes have arisen concerning whether a fourteen-year-old
girl with profound mental retardation and severe spastic quadriplegia is or is
not entitled to a $40 pair of high-top tennis shoes;288 whether a child,
crippled at the age of ten years old by the Hepatitis B vaccination, is
entitled to have the help of an assistant for either five or alternatively eight
hours per day;289 and whether the services of a licensed practical nurse can
be obtained for $50 or $60, per hour.290

284
285
286
287

MARINER, supra note 250, at 36.
See DVIC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 148, at 9.
Palmer, supra note 267 (quoting Denis Hauptly, Special Master, VICP).
Myron Levin, Vaccine Injury Claims Face Grueling Fight: Victims Increasingly View U.S.
Compensation Program as Adversarial and Tightfisted, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A1.
288 See Wilkerson v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-0822V, 1998 WL
106132, at *12 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 24, 1998).
289 See I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *7
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 19, 2013).
290 See Ku v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1370V, 2012 WL 6879061, at *8-9
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 9, 2012).
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2. Prospects for Health Courts?
Like the VICP, health courts are apt to encounter significant—yet
heretofore unforeseen—difficulties in the course of damage calculations.
Indeed, while there are relevant differences between the two systems, by the
time these differences are tallied and their effects analyzed, it seems that,
compared to the VICP, health courts are actually poised to have a harder
time.
a. Four Characteristics of Health Courts that Might Produce a Comparative
Advantage
There are four ways in which health courts differ from the VICP, where,
when it comes to simplifying damage calculations, health courts might offer
a comparative advantage. First, health courts would simplify all
noneconomic damage awards, while the VICP requires an individualized
assessment of such awards if the petitioner’s damages fall below the
$250,000 cap.291
Second, claimant characteristics probably cut in favor of health courts.
Health courts probably have the edge because a non-trivial proportion of
VICP petitioners are young, suffer permanent injuries, and yet have normal
(or close-to-normal) life expectancies—a combination which compels special
masters to estimate what care will be needed over the course of a long
period.292 In comparison, the health court claimant population is apt to be
older and sicker, with shorter life expectancies demanding damage
estimation.293
Third, health courts would have one ALJ-appointed life-care planner
(i.e., an expert who obtains up-to-date information about the victim to
project and quantify the victim’s future needs) monetize the victim’s past
and future economic loss.294 In comparison, in the VICP, it is “common
practice” for each party (the petitioner and HHS) to retain its own life-care
planner.295 Then, once the dueling planners’ reports are compiled, the
291

Compare supra note 101 (concerning health courts), with supra note 143 (concerning the

VICP).
292 This, however, is changing. With the Program’s inclusion of the flu vaccine in 2005,
adults have, in recent years, comprised the majority of petitioners seeking VICP compensation.
See Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Transcript of
Meeting of Dec. 6, 2012, at 13-14, 26-29, 50-51, 60, available at http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/accvtranscript1262012.pdf.
293 See infra notes 300-01 (concerning the poor health of many medical malpractice victims).
294 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 468.
295 I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *2 (Fed.
Cl. Apr. 19, 2013).
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parties will either compromise their differences, or, in rare instances, they
will call upon the special master to evaluate the competing plans and issue a
judgment.296 The effect of this one-planner versus two-planner difference is
debatable. Limiting life-care planners eliminates certain conflicts (removing
the need for a special master to weigh in, for instance, on a nurse’s hourly
wage). This could simplify calculations. On the other hand, health courts’
one-planner requirement might just alter disputes’ timing and character. If
only one planner can be selected, that is, gone will be disagreements over
the relative merit of dueling plans. But those disagreements could be
replaced with new clashes over the planner’s selection, the evidence the
planner can consult, and the methodology he or she ought to utilize.
Fourth, compared to the VICP, where damages are awarded once and in
a lump sum—though often with an annuity—damages in health courts are
to be paid periodically and remain open to modification.297 Again, the effect
of this difference is questionable. Permitting award modifications might
expedite initial compensation calculations, effectively taking the pressure off
getting it right the first time around. On the other hand, the cumulative
effect of periodic review might be to complicate compensation
determinations—essentially replacing one time-consuming and costly
adjudication with several such skirmishes. On this score, it is worth noting
that the Vaccine Act initially permitted damage revisions. Prevailing VICP
petitioners, Congress initially explained, could seek additional damages if,
for example, their medical costs rose or their condition deteriorated, while
they had the duty to return to the Program if their costs fell or their
condition improved.298 Congress repealed those provisions in a 1987
amendment, however—prompted, at least in part, by parents’ demands for
greater certainty and finality.299
296 See Toomey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 98-643V, 2007 WL 5173629, at *4
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 2, 2007) (describing the damages procedure); cf. Advisory Comm’n on Childhood
Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript of the Meeting of Dec. 8, 2011, at 17-18
(“[I]n the last few years . . . there has been a settlement in every single case on the issue of
damages.” (quoting Mark Rogers, Torts Branch, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)).
297 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465. Alongside the problems discussed
above, this approach encourages malingering, sometimes called after-the-event moral hazard.
298 See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 311(a), 100
Stat. 3755, 3762; see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 17 (1986) (explaining that “[a] petitioner
awarded compensation shall notify the Program of any changes which significantly affect the
compensation to be paid” while also advising that “if medical costs rise more quickly than expected
or if the petitioner’s injury becomes more serious, he or she may ask for increased and more
frequent payment”).
299 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4303(d)(2)(A), 101
Stat. 1330-1, 1330-222 (1987). At the time of the 1987 amendment, Representative Henry Waxman
(the Vaccine Act’s main sponsor) explained: “We cannot expect these people to give up funda-
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b. Six Characteristics of Health Courts that Might Produce a Disadvantage
Now, while the effect of the deviations above might cut in favor of
health courts, there are six ways in which health courts’ damage calculations
are likely to be more complex and cumbersome than damage calculations
within the VICP. First, as noted previously, the Vaccine Act simplifies
damages in all death cases (imposing a hard limit of $250,000) and also
streamlines the calculation of minors’ lost wage. Leading health court plans
do not contain these shortcuts.
Second, unlike the VICP, which adjudicates mostly claims of those who
were well prior to vaccination, health courts will typically adjudicate claims
of those who were sick.300 Indeed, Paul Weiler’s classic New York study
reports: “[A] substantial proportion of patients were gravely ill, and many
would have died from their underlying illnesses in months, days, perhaps
hours, even absent the mishap in treatment.” 301 This fact not only creates
difficult causation questions (discussed below), it is also apt to raise, within
health courts, vexing questions of damage aggravation and apportionment.
Specifically, physicians are likely to argue that they are responsible for only
the aggravation of the patient’s underlying condition (which, itself, will
require detailed evidence of the patient’s pre-avoidable-injury prognosis).
Patients, meanwhile, are likely to counter that, in at least some cases, the
aggravation combines with the existing injury to create an indivisible injury
for which the physician is wholly responsible. Creating tangled questions of
fact and law, these damage aggravation issues are unlikely to be easily
resolved.302
Third, unlike in the VICP context where there is just one respondent
(HHS, represented by staff lawyers within the DOJ), many health court
mental rights if they cannot depend on the compensation payments.” 1987 House Hearing, supra
note 119, at 11 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman); see id. at 61 (statement of Jeffrey H.
Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents Together) (advocating lump-sum payments and
maintaining that “[f]unding sources have to be reliable and adequate”).
300 The CDC cautions against administering childhood vaccines to ill individuals. See Chart
of Contraindications and Precautions to Commonly Used Vaccines, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/vac-admin/contraindications-vacc.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5VJD-MUHG.
301 WEILER ET AL., supra note 59, at 55. Similarly, a 2001 study found that “many deaths
reportedly due to medical errors occur at the end of life or in critically ill patients in whom death
was the most likely outcome, either during that hospitalization or in the coming months,
regardless of the care received.” Hayward & Hofer, supra note 234, at 418-19.
302 See, e.g., Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1974) (explaining that the defendant
physician typically bears “the burden of segregating recoverable damages from those solely
incident to the preexisting disease”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 177, at 433
(2000) (describing the “[e]specially difficult problems of causation [that] arise when the defendant
is negligent toward a plaintiff who is already suffering from a disease or disability”).
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claims will implicate numerous defendants. Relevant here, Neil Vidmar’s
North Carolina study found that less than one-third of medical malpractice
cases were brought against a single healthcare provider; 16% of claims
involved five defendants or more.303 This means that, in health courts
(though not in the VICP), the liability of multiple defendants will need to
be assessed, with the damages attributable to each quantified and
monetized.
Fourth, because health courts evaluate the physician’s conduct, they
presumably will evaluate the plaintiff ’s conduct—most notably in
considering whether the plaintiff reasonably mitigated her damages after
sustaining a compensable medical injury.304 Assuming this mitigation is fair
game,305 health courts will have to assess and quantify which portion of the
plaintiff ’s injury would have been avoided if the plaintiff had utilized
reasonable care and then determine how to subtract this from the plaintiff ’s
compensable damages.306
Fifth, health courts will likely adjudicate claims involving a physician’s
failure to obtain informed consent prior to initiating treatment. These
informed consent claims raise unique causation pitfalls. To prevail, the
plaintiff must first establish “injury causation” (i.e., that the plaintiff would
have been spared the particular harm if she had not undergone the
challenged procedure). This inquiry requires conjecture about what
alternate procedure the doctor may have performed and the foreseeable
risks thereof. Then, a plaintiff must also show “decision causation.” This
requires showing both that the plaintiff, personally, would have withheld
consent to the challenged course of treatment if she had been adequately
informed, and also that a “prudent person in the patient’s position” would

303 See VIDMAR, supra note 233, at 33. For more on this study, involving medical malpractice
cases filed in North Carolina federal and state courts from 1984–1987 and 1987–1989, see id. at 2324. Likewise, a 2006 study of medical malpractice claims found that “the majority of injuries
involved more than one health care provider: 60% involved two or more clinicians, and a quarter
involved three or more.” Mello & Studdert, supra note 163, at 605; accord Charles Silver, Does
Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2102 (2002) (concluding that “increasing the
number of defendants causes litigation costs per dollar transferred to rise”).
304 See DOBBS, supra note 302, §§ 203–204, at 510-14 (describing the avoidable consequences
doctrine).
305 Of course, health courts could ignore the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate her injuries—but to
do so would be contrary to health courts’ broader aim of reducing the social cost of medical injury.
306 Cf. COMM’N ON MED. PROF’L LIAB., AM. BAR ASS’N, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE
EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 67-68 (1979) (recognizing that, “to invite inquiry on a
case by cases basis into the effects of patients’ conduct would generate the sorts of delays and
transaction costs which the DCE approach [similar to the ACE approach] is designed to
eliminate”).

2015]

A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts

1697

have likewise declined treatment.307 Hypothesizing what this patient, and
also what any reasonably prudent patient, would do in a given scenario is
hardly straightforward—and, in fact, it is an inquiry that juries (comprised,
of course, of current and future patients), not official “experts,” might be
better suited to conduct.
Sixth and finally, health courts, but not the VICP, must presumably
wrestle with the “loss of chance” doctrine. Accepted now in over twenty
states, this doctrine enables a plaintiff to obtain damages when the
physician’s medical malpractice reduced the patient’s chance of recovery or
survival—even if it cannot be said that the medical malpractice more-likelythan-not caused the patient’s injury or death.308 Again, lost chance cases
raise complications for health courts as, assuming they accept the doctrine,
health courts would not only need to pinpoint the “avoidable” misdiagnosis
or error in treatment.309 They would also, necessarily, have to quantify and
then monetize the probability of the patient’s survival or recovery both
before and after the physician’s misdiagnosis or mistake.
*

*

*

The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that, in the VICP context, it was
assumed that damages would be relatively easy to quantify. In reality,
however, VICP damages calculations are surprisingly difficult. Many take
years. Health courts will also need to calculate a victim’s future economic
loss and, compared to the VICP, will have to do so (1) with arguably fewer
statutory shortcuts; (2) often in the course of apportioning damages
between various healthcare providers; (3) typically while quantifying the
defendant’s aggravation of a plaintiff ’s underlying medical condition; (4)
while, at least sometimes, reducing the plaintiff ’s damages because of the
plaintiff ’s negligent aggravation of her avoidably inflicted injury; (5) while,
on some occasions, guessing what a hypothetical patient would have agreed
to concerning medical treatment if adequately informed; and (6) in certain
307 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also DOBBS, supra note 302,
§ 250, at 657 (describing the rule and noting that it “does not reflect the [normal] causation
requirement but imposes some additional and most unusual obstacle”).
308 For more on this doctrine’s application and acceptance, see Herskovits v. Group Health
Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions of Authority, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 975-77 (2009); Steven R. Koch, Whose Loss Is It Anyway? Effects of the
“Lost Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV. 595,
606 n.56 (2010).
309 If the doctrine is rejected, health courts’ adoption would effect a major, though so far
unacknowledged, change in substantive law.
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cases, calculating compensation for a plaintiff ’s lost chance at recovery or
survival. In light of these obstacles, damage calculations within health
courts are almost certain to be more nettlesome than many now anticipate.
V. LARGER LESSONS: WHY DID THE VICP STUMBLE, AND WHAT DOES
IT MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF ALTERNATIVE
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS?
Many of the VICP’s promises have gone unfulfilled. Despite
expectations that the VICP would rationalize entitlement decisions, a lack
of predictability continues to bedevil the program. Despite assurances that
VICP petitions would be resolved quickly—within 240 days—most cases
stretch on for years. And, despite valiant legislative efforts to streamline
damages determinations, calculating individualized compensation remains
time-consuming and challenging.
Part IV’s exploration of the VICP’s unfulfilled promises cast a shadow
on certain of health courts’ proponents’ claims. It simultaneously revealed
key insights that transcend health courts in their scope and applicability.
Generalizable insights include: (1) some inconsistency in decisionmaking is,
by all accounts, inevitable, particularly when cases are complex, politically
charged, and dependent on findings concerning witness credibility; (2)
because specialized tribunals are not diversified, they are susceptible to
abrupt swings in the size of their dockets, which (as Richard Posner has
theorized, and the VA Agent Orange experience illustrates) can stall or
stymie case resolution; and (3) no matter how much policymakers strive to
streamline compensation decisions, at least when injuries are serious, the
individualized calculation of future economic loss remains difficult.
Now, Part V steps back from particular problems (such as inconsistency,
delay, and damage difficulties) to ask two broader questions: Why did the
VICP stumble? And: What larger lessons can be drawn from the VICP
experience? This broader perspective reveals four additional insights, with
implications, not only for health courts, but for our design and deployment
of future specialized courts and tort replacement mechanisms in areas far
beyond the medical malpractice arena. These include: (1) certain kinds of
causation questions are insusceptible to easy resolution; (2) decision aids
can be a double-edged sword; (3) boundary claims and segregability issues
can pose a substantial burden—and the less self-contained a substantive area
is, the more serious those problems will be; and (4) adversarialism is
inescapable.
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A. Certain Kinds of Causation Questions Are Insusceptible to Easy Resolution
It has long been known that, in order for a no-fault system to maintain
low transaction costs, the system must be able to resolve causation questions
quickly, reliably, and with minimal discovery. Given this, it is perhaps no
surprise that workplace and automobile accidents have, so far, been most
amenable to a no-fault solution. In both, determining whether an injury
“arises out of ” employment (in the case of workers’ compensation) or the
use of a motor vehicle (in the case of automobile no-fault) is generally
straightforward, as injuries typically result from visible and undeniable
trauma, as machines misfire or cars collide.310 In contrast, there are other
kinds of injuries that are not traumatic, visible, or otherwise uncontested.
When confronting this constellation of injury, American no-fault regimes
have consistently struggled.
Vaccine injuries fall into this latter, troublesome category. Unlike car
wrecks or traditional workplace accidents, vaccine injuries are not traumatic
or observable. Then, further confounding the causation inquiry, vaccines do
not trigger “signature diseases,” meaning that ailments caused by vaccines
can also be caused by other mechanisms. And, many vaccines are
administered to infants and young children, while neurological disorders
often—just coincidentally—show up in the first years of life. This means
that many neurological disorders become evident on the heels of a child’s
vaccination, creating a suspicious, though sometimes merely coincidental,
temporal association.311
Not surprisingly, the above facts have complicated causation
determinations within the VICP. And this complexity has, in turn, been a
substantial, though unanticipated, drag on the system, contributing to many
of the problems identified above, including the difficult judgment calls
special masters must make (which leads to a lack of consistency and
predictability) and the long times to decision. Thus, when assessing why the
VICP has stumbled, some of the blame ought to be laid here: at the
elemental scientific uncertainty at the root of the causal inquiry.
Importantly, too, in confronting—and becoming stymied by—elemental
scientific uncertainty, the VICP is not alone. Comparable problems have
plagued both state workers’ compensation systems when adjudicating
occupational disease claims and the neurological birth injury funds in
Florida and Virginia. On the former, occupational disease claims compel
adjudicators to determine whether this disease was caused by that workplace
310
311

A notable exception is workplace occupational disease, discussed below.
See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 4.
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contaminant, which is challenging, particularly when the disease is nonsignature, latent (i.e., exposure and disease manifestation are separated in
time), and can arise synergistically from the interaction of several
substances.312 Predictably, given these factual impediments, occupational
disease cases have been insusceptible to easy resolution, generating long
delays,313 inconsistent outcomes,314 high rates of attorney retention,315 high
levels of formal contestation,316 and a high degree of undercompensation.317
The experience of neurological birth injury funds in Florida and Virginia
tells a similar story.318 The crux of the problem there is that many
neurological birth injury claims involve cerebral palsy, a general term for a
group of permanent, non-progressive movement disorders that cause
physical disability. Most cases of cerebral palsy (perhaps as many as 90%)
are attributable to genetic or other conditions; relatively few are iatrogenic.
But knowing which box to put a particular child’s injury into is
extraordinarily difficult—leading authors of one recent study to conclude
regretfully “as long as determination of causal factors remains part of the
compensation criteria, pivotal uncertainties persist.”319
This yields a pair of crucial insights: (1) If particular conditions are met
(namely, injuries are not traumatic, visible, or otherwise obvious), causation
questions are unlikely to be easily resolved, and (2) in such cases,
adjudications are unlikely to be predictable, simple, or swift. Indeed, many
of a no-fault system’s supposed benefits appear to dissipate the moment
those systems confront causation questions steeped in scientific
uncertainty.320

312 See PETER S. BARTH WITH H. ALLAN HUNT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION & WORKRELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 5-10, 62-89 (1980) (cataloging factual challenges).
313 See id. at 163, 169.
314 See id. at 61-62.
315 See id. at 163 tbl.5.17 (reporting that, whereas lawyers are involved in only 14.6% of accident claims, lawyers are involved in 65.5% of claims asserting occupational disease).
316 See id. at 163 tbl.5.16 (reporting that, whereas 9.8% of accident claims proceed to a formal
hearing, 62.7% of occupational disease claims do).
317 See J. Paul Leigh & John A. Robbins, Occupational Disease and Workers’ Compensation:
Coverage, Costs, and Consequences, 82 MILBANK Q. 689, 709 (2004) (estimating that, at most,
workers’ compensation covers 20% of the costs of occupational disease).
318 A recent review of the Florida and Virginia birth injury programs explains that “no one
anticipated the reverberations that the causal complexities at the root of the inquiry would create.”
Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 506.
319 Id.
320 Accord O’CONNELL, supra note 42, at 72 (“[A]ny system of coverage or compensation for
injury which moves beyond simple external traumatic impact is destined to encounter prodigious
questions of causation.”).
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Applying those lessons, the ease and confidence with which causation
questions can be resolved might inform our selection of accident types
amenable to no-fault regimes going forward. Here, for example, it is much
easier to assess whether an injury is caused by gun fire, a schoolyard
accident, a railroad derailment, or an airline crash, on the one hand, than it
is to determine whether an injury is caused by a prescription drug or a
cigarette, on the other.321 The former injuries are visible and traumatic; the
latter injuries are not (and most illnesses caused by cigarettes and
prescription drugs do not qualify as signature diseases). Thus, we might
confidently say that (political barriers aside) a no-fault regime for handguns
is far more promising than one for cigarettes.
Further applying the above lessons, those who seek to create a quasi-nofault regime for medical injury face almost inevitable disappointment, as the
causal questions health courts must address will often be suffused with
scientific uncertainty. After all, most medical injuries are not traumatic or
visible. Most patients seek care because they are sick, and sick people’s
health often deteriorates further. This means that most injuries stemming
from medical malpractice will also, necessarily, have competing causes,
wholly apart from a physician’s error.322 Like occupational disease claims,
some medical injuries have long time lags between the physician’s mistake
(e.g., the missed or delayed diagnosis) and its effect (e.g., the cancer
metastasized).323 These delays create complications.324 Then finally, the
health court project adds an additional wrinkle: As noted above, the inquiry
in a health court case will not be merely whether medical care caused the
patient’s injury. It will, instead, be whether “avoidable” or suboptimal
medical care caused the patient’s injury—a much harder determination.

321 See supra notes, 40, 44, 49, and 50 (advocating no-fault regimes for railway accidents,
prescription drugs, cigarettes, and firearm injuries, respectively).
322 See JEFFREY O’CONNELL & CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR BALANCED
TORT REFORM: EARLY OFFERS WITH SWIFT SETTLEMENTS 108 (2008) (“Under a medical nofault scheme it would be therefore necessary to distinguish between the injuries caused by medical
treatment, and those caused by, say, the ‘presenting complaint.’ Unfortunately, it is often
impossible to determine whether a patient was injured by the treatment rendered or just by a
normal extension of the condition that prompted treatment in the first place.”).
323 Misdiagnoses account for a large proportion of medical malpractice lawsuits. See Tejal K.
Gandhi et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Ambulatory Setting: A Study of Closed Malpractice
Claims, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488, 488 (2006) (“Over the past decade, lawsuits alleging
negligent misdiagnoses have become the most prevalent type of claim in the United States.”).
324 See DANZON, supra note 59, at 175 (observing that “delay creates technological uncertainty in establishing the connection between the triggering event and the injury”).
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B. Decision Aids Are a Double-Edged Sword
When analyzing why the VICP has stumbled, the next culprit is surely
the Vaccine Injury Table. The Table has not streamlined causation questions
as substantially as many expected. It has, itself, become the subject of bitter
controversy. And Table amendments have tarnished public perceptions of
the Program. Again, this experience contains a sobering lesson for health
courts, as well as other future specialized courts and replacement regimes
that would rely on decision aids to streamline causation or compensation
questions.
Recall that Congress created the Vaccine Injury Table to simplify and
rationalize causation questions—essentially, to sidestep many of the issues
above. Note, too, that at the time of the VICP’s enactment, it was assumed
that most petitioners would assert on-Table injuries—and, for a time, the
assumption held. Early in the Program’s lifecycle (prior to 1995), roughly
75% of petitioners proceeded down the on-Table track,325 and, consistent
with expectations, these petitioners’ claims were, for the most part, easily
and expeditiously resolved. In the words of the VICP’s chief special master:
“[L]itigating Table cases . . . met Congress’s programmatic desire; that is,
the special masters handle[d] the cases relatively quickly and render[ed]
decisions with certainty.”326
In the mid-1990s, however, there was a momentous shift. Exercising her
statutory Table-modification authority—and relying, in large part, on
findings of the IOM (the health arm of the National Academy of
Sciences)—on March 10, 1995 and again on March 24, 1997, the Secretary of
HHS amended the Table to add to and strike from the Table certain
associated injuries.327 At first glance, the amendments were a wash. In fact,
more injuries were added than were subtracted. However, because HHS
removed the injuries that had been the most frequently utilized by
petitioners, the practical effect of these additions and subtractions was to
shrink the Table’s scope, and importance, dramatically. While 74% of
325
326

See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 14.
Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 WL 387418, at
*7 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001); see also OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, supra note 150, at 42 (“When
the Vaccine Program was created, the expectation was that most cases would involve Table
injuries, and in the early days of the Program, that expectation was borne out. Most Table cases
are quickly resolved, in keeping with the Congressional intent that vaccine injured persons be
compensated quickly, easily, and with generosity.”); Telephone Interview with Gary J. Golkiewicz, VICP Chief Special Master from 1988–2010 (Sept. 23, 2014) (“Under the Table, the system
worked as closely to what Congress intended as you are going to get.”).
327 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 13-14. For more on the sources HHS consulted
while amending the Table, see id. at 22.
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petitions sought compensation for on-Table injuries prior to 1995, only 55%
did by 1999, and now, only about 2% of VICP petitions proceed down the
on-Table path.328 Thus, the Table, which at enactment was viewed as the
VICP’s “most important feature,”329 has, in the words of one lawyer for
petitioners, morphed into “a meaningless thing.”330
This migration away from the Table has had ripple effects, touching
every corner of VICP administration. Compared to on-Table petitions, offTable petitions (where causation is determined by reference to traditional
tort principles) are more likely to be contested, rather than conceded, and
once contested, “take longer to prepare, longer to present, and longer to
decide.”331 Off-Table petitions are also, quite importantly, far less likely to
result in compensation for the petitioner.332 This means that much of the
trouble identified above can be traced, directly, to the Table amendments.
What lessons can we draw from this experience? The most obvious
takeaway is that decision aids’ malleability is a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, decision aids that attempt to crystallize scientific understanding
must be susceptible to amendment, as scientific understanding evolves over
time. If decision aids can’t be updated, they will become antiquated and
inaccurate. On the other hand, though, the need to amend a decision aid
comes with the power to amend a decision aid. If a decision aid is malleable,
in other words, it is also, by definition, manipulable. This means, by
expanding or shrinking a decision aid, the modifying body has the power to
dramatically alter a program’s size, scope, and character.
Further, because these modifications will be so consequential, and
because, too, the science supporting or refuting a modification is rarely
clear-cut,333 decision aid modification is apt to generate controversy. The
328 Compare id. at 14 (offering the 74% and 55% figures), with 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note
52, at 20 (reporting that, since 2009, over 98% of petitions allege off-Table injuries). Further
accelerating the shift toward off-Table adjudications, in recent years, six vaccines have been added
to the Table without the addition of any associated injuries. See id. at 17-20.
329 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 5.
330 Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript
of Meeting of Sept. 17, 2009, at 56 (statement of Clifford Shoemaker, Attorney); see also Telephone Interview with Gary J. Golkiewicz, supra note 326 (“The Table was the centerpiece of the
Program, and now it’s virtually irrelevant.”).
331 Stevens, 2001 WL 387418, at *7.
332 See 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 12 (reporting, as of 1999, that on-Table claims
were nearly three times more likely to be compensated, as compared to their off-Table counterparts).
333 For example, in 1994, the IOM conducted a review of the relationship between vaccines
and medical conditions. IOM’s review found that there was insufficient evidence to prove or
disprove a relationship between vaccines and two-thirds of the seventy-five medical conditions
studied. See id. at 13 n.13.

1704

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1631

VICP illustrates this point, as HHS’s mid-1990s amendments ignited a
firestorm of criticism. Parents and a parents’ advocacy group challenged the
amendments in court, contending that the Secretary of HHS had exceeded
her statutory authority.334 The GAO scolded HHS for “bas[ing] its
decisions to add or remove table injuries on various factors” without “a clear
and transparent methodology to demonstrate that these factors were
consistently applied.”335 The VICP’s chief special master chastised the
government for “alter[ing] the game so that it’s clearly in their favor.”336 The
then-Chair of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines (a group
created by Congress to oversee the VICP) called the amendments “a
repudiation of the principles on which the compensation program” was
enacted.337 And Congress also expressed stern disapproval.338 HHS, for its
part, offered a somewhat tepid defense—highlighting that the amendments
were necessary to ensure that the Table “conform[ed] with the scientific
evidence”339 and emphasizing how “difficult” and “not practical” it is “to try
and fit causation science into very narrow boxes.”340
This discussion of the Table’s controversial status reveals a pair of
additional insights. The first is that decision aids are easily politicized and,
in fact, the more a decision aid helps to resolve close cases (and, thus, the
more value it has from a procedural perspective), the more controversial it will
become. Here’s an illustration from the health court context: Today, it turns
out, patients can catch and identify some errors, such as wrong-site
surgeries, extreme drug overdoses, transfusions with mismatched blood, and
complications caused by forgotten surgical instruments.341 These cases are
334 See Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1996); see also ALLEN, supra note 113, at 293 (discussing
the pervasive “bitterness” parents felt following these amendments); Advisory Comm’n on
Childhood Vaccines, Transcript of Meeting of March 1, 1995, at 113 [hereinafter March 1, 1995
ACCV Transcript] (on file with author) (“We feel like we have been betrayed.” (quoting Barbara
Loe Fisher, Parents’ Activist)).
335 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 3; see also id. at 15 (observing that HHS’s actions
“do not always convey a sense of consistency”).
336 ALLEN, supra note 113, at 293 (quoting Gary Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master, VICP).
337 March 1, 1995 ACCV Transcript, supra note 334, at 2 (statement of Curtis R. Webb,
Chair, ACCV) (on file with author). For more on the ACCV, see supra note 53; see also Telephone
Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“The petitioner community understood that the
Table modifications were a betrayal, a complete abrogation of the principles that underlie the
Program. It was an attempt to neuter the Program.”).
338 H.R. REP. NO. 106-977, at 2 (2000) (finding that HHS’s actions had “undermin[ed] the
remedial nature of the program as intended by the Congress”).
339 Levin, supra note 287 (quoting Joyce G. Somsak, Acting Director, VICP).
340 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 41.
341 See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1113 (2006) (offering these, and other, examples).
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easy. They are apt to result in payment, and they are unlikely to trigger
prolonged contestation. Indeed, susceptible to resolution via the common
knowledge exception or the ancient tort doctrine res ipsa loquitur, many of
these cases do not even require the retention of costly medical experts.342 As
such, if all ACEs do is capture these unequivocal cases, their practical effect
will be marginal. They will be picking only low-hanging fruit, simplifying
only those cases that are already straightforward. On the other hand, if
ACEs do take sides on contested questions—offering guidance at the
frontier of medical injury where, for example, the standard of care is
evolving or treatment guidelines are in flux—they will be truly helpful,
streamlining litigation that would otherwise be hard-fought and spirited.343
But the creation and subsequent amendment of the ACE list will spark
significant criticism.344
The second insight that flows from the Table’s controversial amendment
is related, and concerns health courts’—and other specialized tribunals’—
perceived legitimacy. It has long been said that in order to be effective,
tribunals have to be perceived as legitimate. And in order to be perceived as
legitimate, tribunals must be perceived as being fair.345 If the public, or if
litigants, lack confidence in a tribunal’s fairness, that lack of confidence
diminishes the public’s faith in government, makes unfavorable decisions
harder to accept, and potentially jeopardizes compliance with tribunal
decisions.346 Meanwhile, a drawback long identified with specialized courts
is that, when it comes to being viewed as fair, these tribunals start at a
deficit; they tend to lack generalist courts’ widespread public acceptance and
are “peculiarly susceptible to being thought partisan.”347 The broader lesson,
342 See DANZON, supra note 59, at 38-39, 217 (noting that empirical examination tends to
support “the conventional wisdom that cases involving obvious error tend to be settled out of
court, with relatively low litigation costs”).
343 Cf. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a
Selective No-Fault System, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2836, 2841-42 (1991) (concluding that ACEs can
be used to resolve cases that would otherwise generate controversy).
344 See Clark C. Havighurst, “Medical Adversity Insurance”—Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 1233, 1270 (offering a similar analysis).
345 See Stempel, supra note 33, at 107 (stating that “tribunals must be perceived as fair in
order to adjudicate effectively”).
346 Accord Bruff, supra note 218, at 331 (“Part of a court’s success in obtaining compliance
with its mandates flows from the respect others have for it.”).
347 Currie & Goodman, supra note 33, at 72; see also Stempel, supra note 33, at 89 (suggesting
that a drawback of specialized courts is that they “lack the widespread public acceptance and
perception of fairness that traditionally surround generalist courts”). Health courts’ perceived
legitimacy might be particularly fragile because the plaintiffs’ bar is already opposed to these
tribunals, partly owing to a suspicion that they would be “anti-patient” in orientation. See supra
notes 23-27 (providing examples of arguments opposing health courts).
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then, is the following: If specialized courts or no-fault compensation
schemes rely heavily on decision aids, and if those decision aids must be
initially created and then periodically amended, the decision aids’ creation
and amendment will be politically charged.348 When it comes time first to
create and then subsequently to update the decision aid, there will be
winners and losers. And, among the losers, the public perception of fairness,
already somewhat fragile in specialized courts, risks being tarnished,
perhaps substantially.349
C. Boundary Claims Impose a Substantial Burden
A third broad lesson that flows from the VICP experience is the burden
of boundary definition. Theorists have long identified “boundary problems”
as a potential drawback to specialized courts’ and replacement regimes’
creation.350 What theorists mean is that the creation of specialized schemes
requires policymakers to draw lines to distinguish the cases that fall within
the scheme from those that do not. Then, once lines are drawn, they must
be policed, as litigants, with different incentives, will seek to push lines in
different directions, either to make an end-run around the specialized
tribunal and into the traditional court system, or vice versa.351

348 These lessons also apply—and arguably, especially apply—to the noneconomic damage
schedule that health court proponents plan to devise, as health court architects will need to decide
how to classify injuries by severity, the dollar value to assign to each injury classification, how to
adjust awards for inflation, and whether (or to what extent) ALJs can depart from the heartland in
compelling circumstances. Moreover, health court proponents anticipate periodically amending
this schedule based on “social judgments” concerning what is or is not appropriate injury
compensation. Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 470. If Table revisions based on the
IOM’s findings created a “firestorm” in the VICP context, it is hard to comprehend the conflagration that would attend damage revisions based on amorphous “social judgments.” Cf. Peters, supra
note 13, at 269 (calling these damage revisions a “genuinely frightening idea”).
349 Accord Telephone Interview with Jeffrey H. Schwartz, supra note 199 (“The action of the
Secretary of Health in changing the Table without good science to back up that decision was
simply the final straw.”); Telephone Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“[C]ertainly for
people whose children suffered neurological injury shortly after vaccination, the Table changes
badly damaged perceptions. The Program lost a great deal of legitimacy.”).
350 See, e.g., Oldfather, supra note 33, at 863 (noting that “boundary problems” can give rise
to “administrative difficulties”).
351 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, 6 J.
TORT L. 75, 75-80 (2015) (identifying the recurring problem of “exit” and explaining how exit, if
left unchecked, can erode many of specialization’s ostensible advantages); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 198 (2008) (“So long as any categorical
boundaries between no-fault and tort exist . . . claimants and their lawyers will always face strong
incentives to prosecute claims in whatever remains of the tort system . . . .”).
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1. Traditional Boundary Claims
These boundary problems have been a significant and well-documented
drag on workers’ compensation—as, when the employer is not at fault,
workers strive to fall within the system, and when the employers’
misfeasance is obvious, workers are just as eager to hatch their escape.352
Boundary problems have also dogged the Florida neurological birth injury
program described above as, again, those with strong negligence claims have
exited the program, seemingly at will.353 Boundary problems have plagued
automobile no-fault regimes, contributing to the high cost of no-fault
automobile insurance and, ultimately, legislators’ repeal of the legislation in
several states.354 And boundary problems (though of an unusual and
unexpected character) have also bedeviled the VICP.355
Autism litigation offers a case in point. As noted, autism petitions—
typically alleging that Thimerosal (a mercury-containing vaccine
preservative) cause the affliction—have recently flooded the Program.356
Complicating these cases is the jurisdictional question of whether
Thimerosal claims have to be filed—or even can be filed—in the VICP since
Thimerosal is not obviously a “vaccine” within the Vaccine Act’s statutory
definition.357 That question, in turn, raises a tricky question of statutory
interpretation: Is Thimerosal an “adulterant or contaminant,” as petitioners
claim, which would exclude these cases from the Vaccine Act’s purview? Or
is Thimerosal a “constituent material” of vaccines, as vaccine manufacturers
and HHS insist, which would mean that the Vaccine Act preempts
Thimerosal-related litigation? The question has generated a boatload of

352 See Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, supra note 351, at
83-85 (cataloging ways in which workers bypass workers’ compensation, in favor of recovery
within the traditional tort system).
353 See generally Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In, supra note 22 (describing claimants’ successful “end run” around the Florida birth injury fund).
354 See Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation, supra note 21, at 344-47.
355 I say “unusual and unexpected” because, when the VICP was enacted, many fretted that
vaccine-injured claimants would enter the tort system using the tort opt-out provision, described
above in Section II.B. As noted, those worries were misplaced; few petitioners who receive an
award within the VICP reject their award and proceed to file a civil action, and even petitioners
whose claims are denied tend to acquiesce to the denial. However, vaccine-injured litigants have
nonetheless entered the tort system via other unanticipated avenues.
356 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
357 The provision defines the term “vaccine-related injury or death” to mean “an illness,
injury, condition, or death associated with one or more of the vaccines set forth in the Vaccine
Injury Table, except that the term does not include an illness, injury, condition, or death
associated with an adulterant or contaminant intentionally added to such a vaccine.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-33(5) (2012).
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litigation, in both the VICP and beyond.358 Further complicating matters, in
2002, Congress passed a statute to clarify that the Vaccine Act’s “Definition
of Vaccine” “includes all components and ingredients listed in the vaccine’s
product license application and product label.”359 This measure seemingly
settled the controversy. But then, the following year, Congress repealed the
amendment,360 while noting that its action should not be interpreted to
mean that Leroy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (a case that held
that the Vaccine Act encompassed Thimerosal claims) was incorrectly
decided.361 Then, in 2006, the Fifth Circuit held that, though Thimerosal is
a vaccine, Thimerosal manufacturers are not vaccine “manufacturers” under
the Act—and, thus, suits specifically targeting these defendants can proceed
unencumbered.362
Thimerosal’s murky status has thus been a substantial, but unexpected,
site of controversy. It has not been the only one. In recent years, some
autism plaintiffs have snuck out of the VICP and into court by seeking de
minimis damages below the Vaccine Act’s jurisdictional injury-severity
threshold.363 Recognizing that the Vaccine Act does not preempt claims for
injunctive relief, other plaintiffs have sought court-ordered medical
monitoring of all Thimerosal-exposed, but currently healthy, individuals.364
Finally, seizing on the fact that the Vaccine Act applies only to those who
have “received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table,”365 still other

358 See, e.g., Laughter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 406 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Benasco v. Am. Home Prods., No. 02-3577, 2003 WL 22174270 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2003); Wax v.
Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Bertrand v. Aventis Pasteur Labs.,
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Ariz. 2002); Liu v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 762
(W.D. Tex. 2002); Owens v. Am. Home Prods., 203 F. Supp. 2d 748 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Garcia v.
Aventis Pasteur Inc., No. 02-0168, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15122 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2002);
Leroy v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-392V, 2002 WL 31730680 (Fed. Cl.
Oct. 11, 2002).
359 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1716, 116 Stat. 2135, 2321.
360 See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. L, § 102(a), 117
Stat. 11, 528.
361 See id. § 102(c), 117 Stat. at 528 (citing Leroy, 2002 WL 31730680). Congress’s retraction
was apparently precipitated by an outcry from parents’ groups. See Beverly Jones Sill, Comment,
Toussaint v. Merck & Co.: Opening the Door to Thimerosal Vaccine Litigation in Civil Court?, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 773, 785 (2005).
362 See Holder v. Abbot Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Reilly ex rel.
Reilly v. Wyeth, 876 N.E.2d 740, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
363 See Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Div. of Vaccine Injury Comp., Transcript
of Meeting of Mar. 16, 2004, at 79-80 (statement of Randy Moss, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering) (on file with author).
364 See id.
365 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs have filed derivative suits, seeking damages for parents’ loss of
consortium when an autism-afflicted child fell ill.366
All told, the lesson from the autism saga, which involved over 5500
VICP petitions, at least 350 lawsuits, eleven putative class actions (including
one brought on behalf of 175 million Americans), all three branches of
government, years of litigation, and tens of millions of dollars in legal fees,
is that, even when boundaries are carefully demarcated, gray areas persist. It
is, of course, difficult to identify the fault lines in health courts’ current
jurisdictional definition. (Perhaps plaintiffs will take a page from VICP
petitioners and enter the tort system seeking medical monitoring or by
raising loss of consortium claims for a family member’s impairment.
Perhaps they will seize on health courts’ carve-out for intentional torts and
mixed coverage/treatment claims against managed health care
organizations.367 Perhaps they will invent entirely new arguments.) But the
VICP experience, especially when considered alongside the experiences of
workers’ compensation regimes, neurological birth injury funds, and auto
no-fault statutes, underscores that if the stakes are high, gaps will be
found—and, when gaps are found, end-runs around the no-fault scheme can
erode its administrative advantages.
2. Segregability
A closely related issue is what Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss calls
“segregability,” by which she means the extent to which claims in specialized
courts are self-contained or instead spill over into courts of general
jurisdiction. All things equal, the more self-contained an area of law is, the
better suited it is to specialized treatment; the more “integrated” an area of
law is, the less suited it is to such specialized treatment.368 And of course,
when considering whether to deploy a specialized court or no-fault regime,
a policymaker ought to weigh the substantive area’s factual and legal
entanglements.
This insight is ominous for health courts because some medical
malpractice claims are not self-contained.369 Some such claims, for example,
366 See, e.g., Moss v. Merck & Co., 381 F.3d 501, 504-06 (5th Cir. 2004); Schafer v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994).
367 See Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461 (explaining that such claims would
remain under the jurisdiction of general tort law).
368 See Dreyfuss, supra note 33, at 409-12; see also Bruff, supra note 218, at 339 (suggesting
that, when constructing specialized courts, policymakers should select areas that do not contain
“integrated subject matter”).
369 Problems identified herein would be exacerbated if health courts are initially rolled out in
small pilot projects where “[p]atients would join the system through their choice of provider.”
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arise out of another tortious injury: A plaintiff might be tortiously injured
in a car wreck and then negligently treated once in the hospital. It is blackletter law in most states that the at-fault motorist bears some liability for
the actions of the errant physician; the two actions in this example are, thus,
“integrated.”370 Meanwhile, some medical malpractice claims arise alongside
product liability claims. So, for example, plaintiffs alleging pharmaceutical
injury frequently sue both the drug manufacturer and the clinician who
prescribed or administered the dangerous drug.371 Again, the liability of the
two actors is logically connected, and the current system sensibly
adjudicates both at once. So, too, some medical malpractice claims give rise
to civil rights actions, such as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal
Rehabilitation Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).372 Here,
a secondary defendant is not involved; however, the claim’s resolution still
requires consideration of decidedly non-medical matters.
It remains to be seen how these “integrated” claims would be
adjudicated within a health court system, as there are four obvious
adjudicatory possibilities, but each has serious drawbacks. The first option
would be to give plaintiffs with integrated claims the freedom to select their
tribunal. Yet arming plaintiffs with this freedom would, in some cases, run
up against certain defendants’ right of removal373 and, even when it is
Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461; see also id. (advocating these roll-outs). It is not
at all clear where a patient who sustains a single tortiously inflicted, indivisible injury at the hands
of doctor x (enrolled in a health court) and doctor y (not enrolled in a health court) would be able
to initiate a claim for compensation.
370 See V. Woerner, Annotation, Civil Liability of One Causing Personal Injury for Consequences
of Negligence, Mistake, or Lack of Skill of Physician or Surgeon, 100 A.L.R.2d 808 § 2 (1965) (“[M]ost
of the courts which have considered the question have taken the view that the original tortfeasor is
liable for the consequences of negligence, mistake, or lack of skill on the part of the physician or
surgeon who treats the original injury.”).
371 The landmark Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), is just such a case, as Diana Levine
initially sued Wyeth and the clinician (and the clinician’s employer) who improperly administered
the Phenergan at issue.
372 See, e.g., Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (evaluating a claim that the
HIV-positive patient’s treatment violated, inter alia, the ADA and the Federal Rehabilitation
Act); Morgan v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 912, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (considering
whether the plaintiff’s allegedly unlawful detention at a New York mental health facility
constituted medical malpractice and violated the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42
U.S.C. § 1981); see also William Landess, Medical Malpractice—New Malpractice Twist: Civil Rights
Claims, OUTPATIENT SURGERY (Aug. 2012), http://www.outpatientsurgery.net/issues/2012/08/
medical-malpractice-new-malpractice-twist-civil-rights-claims, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZWZZ9GC (noting that “we’re now seeing more and more patients claim civil rights violations that
essentially allege malpractice”).
373 As it is, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) gives defendants a right of removal, stating:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
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possible, would promote forum shopping, perhaps to the point of tempting
plaintiffs to tack on frivolous claims (against non-physician secondary
defendants, for example) since the inclusion of such claims would trigger
the forum selection choice.374 Second, policymakers might return integrated
medical malpractice claims to the traditional judicial system en masse. That,
however, would erode many of the physician-side benefits that health courts
seek to confer, while (still) encouraging frivolous claiming. Third,
policymakers might divert integrated claims to health courts en masse. But
this seems wholly infeasible. This action would again (in some instances)
raise federal jurisdictional problems, and it also would task ALJs with
deciding matters totally outside their sphere of expertise (car wreck and
product liability cases, for example). A final—and apparently the favored—
option is to conduct two separate adjudications.375 However, those separate,
often overlapping, adjudications would impose a heavy administrative
burden on litigants (eroding efficiencies health courts might otherwise
confer), tax public resources (forced to fund parallel adjudications), and
create a risk of inconsistent judgments. Moreover, when physician and nonphysician defendants are both involved, policymakers would still need to
resolve the vexing question of how to allocate damages among defendants
inside and outside the traditional tort system. Or, if there is no damage
allocation, that would effect a significant, and potentially ill-considered,
alteration of substantive law.
D. Adversarialism Is Inescapable
The final broad insight is that adversarialism is inescapable. Both the
VICP and health courts aim to quell the adversarialism of dispute
resolution.376 But, when assessing why the VICP has struggled, it seems
obvious that one final reason is that adversarialism has crept back in.
Adversarialism’s persistence within the VICP, once again, has implications,
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
374 See Bruff, supra note 218, at 339 (discussing the forum shopping risk).
375 Cf. Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 461 (stating that “medical product liability claims . . . would remain under the jurisdiction of the tort system”).
376 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A) (2012) (charging VICP special masters with crafting
rules to “provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding for the resolution of
[VICP] petitions”); Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 103 tbl.6 (predicting that
health courts are “less likely to provoke defensiveness and adversarialism among physicians” and
identifying a “[l]ess adversarial process” as one of eight benefits health courts would confer on
claimants).
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not only for health courts, but for our creation and consideration of other
no-fault mechanisms.
By statute, Congress directs special masters “to provide for a lessadversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding.”377 Yet as early as 1989,
Congress expressed regret that, despite this statutory directive, “all
participants ha[d], to some degree, maintained their traditional adversarial
litigation postures,” and Congress implored VICP participants to “rededicat[e]” themselves “to the creation of an expeditious, less adversarial,
and fair system.”378 Notwithstanding Congress’s urging, however, many
report that, over the years, the system’s adversarial nature has endured—and
even grown more pronounced. When the Federal Judicial Center conducted
a survey of VICP special masters in the mid-1990s, the special masters’ chief
complaint was that the DOJ lawyers were “behaving like . . . adversar[ies]”
and “over-litigating” various claims.379 Congressional leaders, who have held
numerous hearings to examine the VICP’s operation, have concluded that
the Program engenders “avoidable, protracted and adversarial litigation.”380
A medical expert, who has long participated in the Program, has observed:
“What should be a quiet, civil, deliberative discussion of facts and medicine
too frequently degenerates into a contentious, vituperative, decibelescalating exchange.”381 Most academics concur. For example, Professor
Peter Meyers, who has written extensively about the Program and directs
George Washington University Law School’s Vaccine Injury Clinic
concluded in 2011 that the VICP “is no longer the quick, informal, and less
adversarial program that Congress intended it to be.”382

377 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A).
378 H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 512 (1989).
379 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 44.
380 H.R. REP. NO. 106-977, at 2 (2000); see

id. at 13 (describing “questionable practices” by
DOJ lawyers).
381 Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 63 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 House Hearing] (statement of Dr. Arnold Gale, Medical Expert, Stanford
Univ.); see also id. at 63 (“Ad hominem attacks on physicians by all attorneys are common.”).
382 Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 851 (2011); see also BURKE, supra note 36, at 161 (noting that, “over time the
amount of lawyering and adversarialism in the [VICP] has grown,” as “medical experts and HHS
officials regularly square off against parents, their lawyers, and opposing medical researchers”);
Boxler, supra note 191, at 2 (observing that the VICP is “mimicking the adversarial nature of
traditional tort litigation”); Elizabeth C. Scott, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act Turns Fifteen, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 362 (2001) (“While causation, timing problems, and
the cost burden of the system all make recovery more difficult for petitioners . . . , the adversarial
nature of the system is perhaps the most difficult hurdle for the inured plaintiffs.”). Even health
court proponents concede that the VICP “has become quite adversarial.” Paul J. Barringer et al.,
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Further, though it is hard to know whether this is the cause or the
consequence, the VICP has also exhibited an unexpectedly heavy reliance
on lawyers.383 Early on, some apparently anticipated that VICP procedures
would be straightforward enough to render counsel superfluous.
Representative Patsy Mink explained in a 1999 hearing, “when we
established this program, we envisioned a system in which citizens would be
able to file claims without assistance from attorneys.”384 Contrary to those
expectations, however, over time, it has become clear that claimants need
counsel—and typically specialized counsel—to successfully navigate the
Program.385
Surprisingly, the adjudication of VICP petitions has been marred by
combativeness, even though three of the Program’s structural features
should logically deter this behavior: (1) The ostensibly culpable party (the
maker of the errant vaccine or at-fault physician) is shielded from liability
and is not a party to VICP proceedings; (2) petitioners’ counsel is paid win
or lose; and (3) the Fund now touts a bulging surplus (some $3.5 billion),
which suggests that a few extra payments (or the provision of $40 sneakers)
should not arouse particular controversy. (Indeed, the surplus is so large

Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 725, 737 (2008).
383 Addressing this chicken-and-egg question, some would suggest that the introduction of
lawyers precipitated the Program’s adversarial nature. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 324-26 (1985) (observing that “[t]he regular introduction of lawyers” into
proceedings is unlikely to contribute to the proceedings’ informality or expedience); Robert A.
Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2,
6-7 (1994) (contending that the legal profession “promot[es] and perpetuat[es] adversarial legal
contestation”).
384 1999 House Hearing, supra note 381, at 13 (statement of Rep. Patsy T. Mink); see also
Telephone Interview with Gary J. Golkiewicz, supra note 326 (noting that, when the Program was
created, “it was expected that pro se’s could handle their cases”); Advisory Comm’n on Childhood
Vaccines, Div. of Vaccine Injury Comp., Transcript of Meeting of Dec. 5, 2001, at 43-44
(statement of Timothy Westmoreland, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform) (on file with author)
(suggesting that, at the time of enactment, congressional leaders anticipated that at least on-Table
claimants would be able to navigate the Program without attorney assistance). But cf. MARINER,
supra note 250, at 43 (observing that the Act “contemplates” that petitioners will be represented by
counsel).
385 In 1992, HHS’s Inspector General reported that 20% of all claimants who had filed petitions as of August 1991 proceeded without the assistance of counsel. But the same report found
that “all of [pro se petitioners’] cases have been dismissed for lack of evidence.” OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 149, at 16 & app. B; accord Telephone Interview with Gary J.
Golkiewicz, supra note 326 (noting that, these days, some cases require technical briefing and
generate legal fees on the claimants’ side of $700,000 to $800,000, calculated on an hourly basis).
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that if payments continue at the current clip, the Program could last another
quarter century with no new revenue.386)
Nor can the VICP experience be written off as idiosyncratic, as in facing
unexpectedly high levels of attorney involvement and a rising tide of
adversarialism, the VICP is not alone.387 Studies of workers’ compensation
systems reveal a similar story—especially in (seemingly analogous) cases of
occupational disease.388 Studies of Florida’s and Virginia’s neurological birth
injury programs surfaced near-identical complaints.389 And a review of auto
no-fault systems reveals a similar rising lawyer-retention tide.390
This discussion reveals two final insights. The first and more concrete
observation is this: Notwithstanding health court proponents’ confident
386 See Jeryl Bier, House to Consider Tax on New Flu Vaccines, WKLY. STANDARD ( June 18,
2013, 10:52 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/house-consider-tax-new-flu-vaccines_
736725.html, archived at https://perma.cc/G8QP-AZKY. On the other hand, it is possible that the
VICP’s unusual attorney payment mechanism (whereby lawyers are paid win or lose) encourages
prolonged contestation. See Boxler, supra note 191, at 24-36 (contending that the VICP’s payment
mechanism creates perverse incentives). Similarly, it may be that careerist lawyers within the DOJ
are uniquely inclined to litigate aggressively—and that lawyers hired by liability insurers or
physicians would face resource or reputational constraints to dampen their adversarial impulses.
Cf. Telephone Interview with Curtis Webb, supra note 253 (“My experience is that the DOJ is at
least as bad as a typical litigant, as, say, a drug company. The typical defendant risks a huge award
if they’re unfeeling about what a seriously injured child needs. But here, the DOJ doesn’t face
repercussions when they take extreme positions.”).
387 See generally Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, supra note
351 (discussing how adversarialism has stymied various no-fault compensation mechanisms within
the United States).
388 See supra note 315 (noting that the majority of occupational disease cases are contested
and involve counsel); see also BURKE, supra note 36, at 39 (“Over time, workers’ compensation
systems have come to look more litigation-like, with lawyers playing a larger role . . . .”); Elinor P.
Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational
Disease, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 157-58 (1987) (“[T]he system that was supposed to
provide speedy compensation as the workers’ quid pro quo to relinquishing tort actions has taken
on many of the trappings of common law litigation—retention of lawyers, delays, cost, and
compromise.” (footnotes omitted)).
389 At the time of enactment, many assumed that claimants would be able to obtain compensation for birth-related injury “without the hassle and expense of obtaining legal representation.”
Siegal et al., supra note 22, at 528-30; see VIRGINIA AUDIT, supra note 52, at 6 (“The expectation
was that the family would not need to hire a lawyer to gain entry into the program.”). In reality,
however, rates of lawyer retention run high, and both the Florida and Virginia programs have, in
time, become surprisingly adversarial. See Engstrom, Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn
Persistence of Tort, supra note 351, at 110-13 (compiling various evidence).
390 Auto no-fault was dubbed “no-lawyer” insurance at enactment because it was assumed
that the claims process would be straightforward enough to render counsel superfluous. See
O’CONNELL, supra note 42, at 10. In fact, however, a significant and growing proportion of injury
victims retain counsel, even to process first-party claims. See Press Release, Ins. Research Council,
Study Finds More Auto Injury Claimaints Are Hiring Attorneys ( July 8, 2014) (on file with
author) (reporting that 36% of personal injury protection claimants retained counsel in 2012, up
from 17% in 1977).
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claims to the contrary,391 claimants in health court claimants will need
lawyers. Health courts may confer many benefits on injury victims, but the
ability to obtain adequate compensation without the assistance of counsel
will not be one of them.
The second and broader insight is that tort replacement regimes, if
around long enough, seem destined to become adversarial. They seem to
reach some kind of “adversarial equilibrium”—becoming, over time, ever
more similar to the tort system that they were designed to supplant.392
Adversarialism’s durability within the VICP—a system that, from an
institutional design perspective, did so many things right—contains a
sobering lesson for the future construction of no-fault mechanisms and also
points the way toward future research on the generalizability and genesis of
this phenomenon.393
CONCLUSION
The above paints a gloomy portrait of the VICP and identifies lessons
that ought to inform the health court debate, as well as our creation and
utilization of future specialized courts and alternative compensation
mechanisms. Still, it is important to keep the above critique in proper
perspective.
First, it is important to recognize that, for all its trouble, the VICP has
not been an unmitigated failure. Successfully shielding manufacturers from
liability, the Program has revitalized the vaccine marketplace. Since the
VICP’s creation, vaccine research has flourished, several new vaccines have
been approved for use, and vaccine prices have (partly) stabilized.394
391 See, e.g., Mello et al., Policy Experimentation, supra note 16, at 103 tbl.6 (identifying
“[e]nhanced ability to file a claim without assistance of attorney” as one of the eight benefits
health courts would confer on claimants); see also Mello et al., “Health Courts,” supra note 85, at 465
(“[C]laimants could easily proceed without the assistance of counsel in most cases.”); Q&A, Health
Courts Seen as Remedy to Rising Health Care Costs, HARTFORDBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20131021/PRINTEDITION/310189963/health-courts-seenas-remedy-to-rising-health-care-costs, archived at http://perma.cc/UKS4-WHKJ (quoting Philip
K. Howard as stating that “health courts will eliminate the need to even hire a lawyer for most
plaintiffs, shaving considerable time and expense off of the current process”); cf. Peters, supra note
13, at 267 (characterizing the assumption that lawyers could be jettisoned as “breathtakingly
naïve”).
392 See Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation, supra note 21, at 371-79 (coining the term “adversarial equilibrium” and studying these dynamics in the auto no-fault context).
393 I intend to explore these questions in future work. See NORA FREEMAN ENGSTROM,
WHY NO-FAULT FAILS (forthcoming).
394 See Cook & Evans, supra note 187, at 877 (“The vaccine marketplace remains healthy;
liability-related vaccine shortages are a distant memory, new vaccines are being licensed, and
many are in various stages of development.”); Avery Johnson, Vaccine Makers Enjoy Immunity:
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Transaction costs are another success story. Mostly owing to strict limits on
payments to petitioners’ counsel, transaction costs within the VICP hover at
around 14% of benefits paid; some 86% of Program funds go directly to
claimants.395 At roughly 50%, the tort liability system’s transaction costs are
substantially higher.396 Finally, as noted above, with a balance of roughly
$3.5 billion, the VICP is certainly on a firm financial footing.397 The VICP,
it bears emphasis, has done certain things well.
Second, this Article’s limits, and ambition, must be clear. Though this
Article casts doubt on proponents’ claims that health courts will eliminate
inconsistencies, resolve cases within a year, and quell adversarialism, there
are still plenty of reasons to support health courts.398 There are also, of
course, plenty of reasons to oppose health courts.399 Indeed, much can be
(and has been) said about health courts, both pro and con, that this Article
leaves unaddressed. Rather than re-litigate the health court case, this Article
attempts to reorient, and conceptually ground, the health court debate.
Third, in identifying problems within the VICP, this Article does not
definitively prove that health courts will fail to provide prompt and
predictable compensation to victims of medical injury. After all, though the
VICP and health courts are alike in many respects, they are not clones. As
with all case studies, it is conceivable that the experience of the VICP
cannot be generalized. And, perhaps most importantly, though this Article
raises numerous concerns about the VICP, only occasionally can it show that
Drug Firms Defend Legal Shield but Others Say Special Court Limits Recourse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2009, at B2 (reporting that the Act “is an important reason why the vaccine business has been
transformed from a risky, low-profit venture in the 1970s to one of the pharmaceutical industry’s
most attractive product lines today”). That said, following the VICP’s creation, vaccine prices did
not drop nearly as sharply as anticipated. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Price of Prevention: Vaccine
Costs are Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2014, at A1 (showing that, in 1986, five recommended
vaccines were $215, while in 2014, the same vaccines cost $937 in inflation-adjusted dollars).
395 See Detailed Information on the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Assessment, EXPECTMORE.GOV, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003807.2005.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XWK3-NMSK (reporting that, “between
FY 2001 and FY 2004,” 86% of compensation within the Fund went directly to claimants “rather
than attorneys or administrative entities”).
396 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN
TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 29 tbl.4.1 (1987) (reporting that, in
auto cases, defendant and plaintiff legal fees consumed forty-five cents of every dollar expended);
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments, supra note 74, at 2031 (calculating
medical malpractice claims’ transaction costs).
397 See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
398 For example, the VICP experience does nothing to undermine—and in fact, supports—
assertions that health courts would reduce transaction costs.
399 For a summary of arguments against health courts, see generally Mehlman & Nance,
supra note 5.
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the VICP underperforms vis-à-vis the tort system when it comes to
adjudicating analogous claims.
Yet it has been said, “Before the traditional tort system is
abandoned . . . there must be substantial grounds to ensure confidence in an
alternative institutional mechanism that would serve as its replacement.”400
When it comes to resolving claims for medical injury, health court
proponents seek to replace common law courts, in place for centuries, with a
new and untested alternative. They have, in large measure, advocated their
reform idea based on health courts’ ability to offer a few concrete
administrative advantages. The VICP experience casts significant doubt on
health courts’ ability to offer those advantages. That experience ought to
shake public confidence in this new alternative mechanism—and inform
future analysis.

400 Rabin, supra note 283, at 962; accord BAUM, supra note 33, at 227 (“Proponents of specialized courts are often assigned a burden of proof. That burden seems appropriate.”).

